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FURTHERING THE ACCOUNTABILITY 
PRINCIPLE IN PRIVATIZED FEDERAL 
CORRECTIONS: THE NEED FOR ACCESS 
TO PRIVATE PRISON RECORDS 
Nicole B. Casarez* 
As American prisons face unprecedented overcrowding, both the 
federal and various state governments have engaged private 
entrepreneurs to operate correctional facilities on a for-profit basis. 
In the federal context, one overlooked consequence of prison privat-
ization involves decreased public access to prison records. When a 
federal agency delegates a public function, like the provision of 
correctional services, to a priVate contractor, the agency frustrates 
the purpose of the Freedom of Information Act. Prison records that 
otherwise would have been available to the public become insulated 
from disclosure by virtue of the contractor's nonagency status. To 
safeguard prisoners' liberty interests and well-being, this Article 
argues that private federal prisons must be just as accountable to 
the public as public prisons. Congress should therefore enact 
legislation subjecting private federal prison records to disclosure 
under the Freedom of Information Act as part of a comprehensive 
program to monitor and oversee private prison operators. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the great prison privatization1 debate,2 both advocates and 
opponents of privatizing prisons agree on the importance of 
• Assistant Professor, University of St. Thomas, Department of Communica-
tion. B.J. 1976, University of Texas; J.D. 1979, University of Texas School of Law; 
M.A. 1991, University of Houston. I am grateful to Professor Sandra Guerra, 
University of Houston School of Law, for reviewing and commenting on this Article. 
1. Because ofits wide range of meanings, "privatization" aptly has been described 
as a "fuzzy concept.• Paul Starr, The Meaning of Privatization, 6 YALE L. & POL 'y REV. 
1, 6 (1988). In this Article, the term refers to government contracting with a private 
entity to manage and operate an entire correctional facility or system. Used in this 
sense, "privatization" would not include publicly operated prisons that contract out 
ancillary functions, such as laundry, medical or food services, or any other involvement 
by the private sector in operating prison industries. 
2. The literature on prison privatization is copious. For a sampling of the commen-
tary on political, legal, and economic issues raised by proprietary prisons, see 
PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS (Gary W. Bowman et al. eds., 1993) and 
PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PuBLIC INTEREST (Douglas C. McDonald ed., 1990). For a 
detailed bibliography regarding private prisons, see Ira P. Robbins, The Legal Dimen-
sions of Private Incarceration, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 531, 796-854 (1989). 
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accountability.3 As part of the criminal justice system, prisons 
serve the public interest by confining, punishing, and, hopefully, 
rehabilitating those convicted. Correctional facilities and their 
operation affect directly the liberty interests of those incarcer-
ated within them. If the state entrusts full management re-
sponsibilities for its prisons to private contractors, it should 
ensure that these contractors in no way abuse the public trust 
or prisoners' rights.4 
One often overlooked but relevant difference between the 
accountability of public and private federal prisons5 involves 
public access to prison records. To illustrate this difference, 
consider the following example. 
Along the United States-Mexico border, summer tempera-
tures are brutal. In its 1991 study, Prison Conditions in the 
United States,6 Human Rights Watch reported that at several 
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) detention 
centers, detainees are forced to remain outdoors for many 
hours a day in the intense heat.7 Could an enterprising report-
er demand access to INS records to document this or other 
3. See, e.g., Joan W. Allen, Use of the Private Sector in Corrections Service 
Delivery, in THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN STATE SERVICE DELIVERY: EXAMPLES OF INNOVA-
TIVE PRACTICES 13, 38-39 (The Council on State Governments & The Urban Institute 
eds., 1989) (arguing that before contracting for private prison operations, a state should 
design and implement an effective monitoring system); Warren I. Cikins, Privatization 
of the American Prison System: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PuB. POL 'y 445, 458-59 (1986) (writing that careful monitoring and strong 
conflict of interest statutes are necessary to avoid corruption in private prisons); 
Michael Keating, Jr., Public Over Private: Monitoring the Performance of Privately 
Operated Prisons and Jails, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PuBLIC INTEREST, supra note 
2, at 130 (positing that the contracting agency must develop clear operational standards 
and effective monitoring techniques to ensure accountability); cf. CHARLES H. LOGAN, 
PRIVATE PRISONS: CONS AND PRos 210 (1990) (stating that monitoring and "motivation" 
are equally important for public and private prisons). 
4. See, e.g., Mary R. Woolley, Prisons for Profit: Policy Considerations for 
Government Officials, 90 DICK. L. REV. 307, 310 (1985) (stating that the government 
must oversee privately operated prisons to safeguard prisoners' constitutional rights). 
5. In this Article, the terms "prisons" and "correctional facilities" are used 
interchangably to refer to jails, prisons, and detention facilities. Generally, jails are 
used to deta.in those convicted of minor offenses and those awaiting trial; prisons are 
used to incarcerate those convicted of more serious crimes; and detention facilities 
are used by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Servi'ce (INS) to confine illegal 
aliens who are to be deported. See MARTIN P. SELLERS, THE HISTORY AND POLITICS 
OF PRIVATE PRISONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 63-64 (1993). Additionally, the U.S. 
Marshals Service uses detention centers to house unsentenced federal detainees. See 
Scott Vath, Prison Privatization Proves a Profitable Tool for Locking up Prisoners, 
AM. CITY & COUNTY, Mar. 1993, at 320. 
6. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRISON CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1991). 
7. Id. at 98 (reporting temperatures of llO"F). 
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practices at various INS facilities? Under current law, the 
Freedom of Information Act8 (FOIA or the Act) allows "any 
person" to gain access to federal agency records, subject to 
only nine listed exemptions.9 Therefore, the FOIA would 
provi~e a means for a reporter to review INS records held at 
the Krome Avenue Processing Center in Miami, but not re-
cords maintained at the El Centro Detention Center in El 
Centro, California. Why the distinction? One facility is oper-
ated by the INS, 10 which, as part of the Department of Justice, 
is a "federal agency" under the FOIA;11 the other is operated 
by a private contractor.12 
This hypothetical highlights an often overlooked conse-
quence of privatizing federal 13 correctional facilities-reduced 
access by the press and public to records regarding the opera-
tion of federal prisons. To protect prisoners' rights, ensure 
quality care, and guard against malfeasance, private prisons 
must be at least as accountable to the public as public pris-
ons.14 When contracting with the private sector to manage its 
correctional services, the federal government thus far has not 
achieved this level 0£ accountability. 15 
This Article explores the limited public access to private 
prison records and the impact of the limitation on account-
ability. Part I briefly discusses the history of prison privatiza-
tion, focusing on the federal experience. Part II examines how 
records prepared by a private contractor would be treated 
under current interpretations of the FOIA. Part III analyzes 
suggested methods to ensure accountability of prison contrac-
tors, and then concludes that Congress should pass legislation 
subjecting private prison records to disclosure under the FOIA. 
8. 5 u.s.c. § 552 (1988). 
9. Id. § 552(a)(3). The nine exemptions allow an agency to withhold records 
relating to national security, internal agency rules, matters exempted from disclosure 
by other federal acts, trade secrets, inter- or intra-agency memoranda, personnel and 
medical files, records compiled for law enforcement purposes, matters concerning the 
operation of financial institutions, and geological information. Id. § 552(b)(l)-(9). 
10. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 92. 
11. 5 u.s.c. § 552(0 (1988). 
12. SELLERS, supra note 5, at 66. 
13. While privatization of state correctional facilities also raises concerns under 
state open records acts, state law questions are beyond the scope of this Article. 
14. See infra text accompanying notes 67-91. 
15. See infra text accompanying notes 98-105. 
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I. PRIVATIZATION OF PRISONS AND THE FEDERAL EXPERIENCE 
Private sector involvement in the operation of prisons has 
made something of a comeback in recent years. Although today 
incarceration often is viewed primarily as a governmental 
function to be undertaken by the state,16 historically, private 
parties have played a significant role in providing correctional 
services.17 
Beginning in sixteenth-century England, private jailers 
commonly ran workhouses as profit-making institutions, where 
prisoners paid for their keep from the money earned by their 
labor.18 During the seventeenth century, England shipped 
convicts to the American colonies by allowing the transporting 
merchants to market the prisoners as indentured servants. 19 
In 1666, one of the first private jailers in the colonies, Ray-
mond Stapleford, constructed a prison in Maryland in return 
for 10,000 pounds of tobacco and lifetime tenure as keeper of 
the facility. 20 Private entrepreneurs and reform groups contin-
ued to operate prisons in the early years of the American 
nation, at a time when differences between "public" and 
"private" were indistinct. 21 By the eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries, however, correctional administration general-
ly was seen as the government's responsibility, and privately 
operated correctional facilities gradually were replaced by 
government-run prisons.22 
In the years before the Civil War, private entrepreneurs 
began to use prisoners from public institutions as sources of 
cheap, involuntary labor.23 Although the advent of the Civil 
16. See, e.g., W. James Ellison, Privatization of Corrections: A Critique and 
Analysis of Contemporary Views, 17 CUMB. L. REV. 683, 696-97 (1987) ("The opera-
tion of a penal system is traditionally a state function."). 
17. SELLERS, supra note 5, at 48-51. 
18. Id. at 48-49. 
19. DAVID N. AMMONS ET AL., THE OPTION OF PRISON PRIVATIZATION: A GUIDE 
FOR COMMUNITY DELIBERATIONS 4 (1992). 
20. Id. 
21. Samuel J. Brakel, •privatization" in Corrections: Radical Prison Chic or 
Mainstream Americana?, 14 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 4 n.7 
(1988). 
22. AMMONS ET AL., supra note 19, at 4. For a discussion of the two American 
prison systems that developed during the nineteenth century, the Pennsylvania 
System and the Auburn System, see SELLERS, supra note 5, at 49-50. 
23. See SELLERS, supra note 5, at 50. 
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War meant the end of convict leasing in parts of the South,24 
wartime destruction of prisons led some southern states to 
establish programs through which prisoners were hired out to 
private businesses.25 During these years, some states, including 
Texas, Mississippi, and Louisiana, leased entire prisons to 
private operators.26 Both approaches frequently resulted in 
graft, corruption, and the exploitation and maltreatment of 
inmates.27 
By the end of the nineteenth century, a number of states had 
prohibited contract prison labor;28 however, the contracting 
system persisted in some states into the twentieth century.29 
In 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt issued an executive 
order forbidding the use of convict labor on federal projects. 30 
During the early to mid-twentieth century, labor unions 
persuaded legislators to forbid the manufacture and sale of 
prison-produced items to the public.31 By1960, convict-leasing 
programs in the states had been largely abolished, in part 
because of journalists who exposed the evils of the system to 
the public. 32 In the 1970s, modest prison industry programs 
were viewed more as useful vocational opportunities than as 
significant ways to reduce prison costs.33 
Even after 1960, however, the private sector remained in-
volved in the corrections field, albeit in limited areas such as 
medical and food services.34 Additionally, certain "secondary" 
facilities, such as juvenile homes and adult halfway houses, 
24. Id. 
25. AMMONS ET AL., supra note 19, at 4. 
26. Id. 
27. John J. Diiulio, Jr., The Duty to Govern: A Critical Perspective on the Private 
Management of Prisons and Jails, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PuBLIC INTEREST, 
supra note 2, at 155, 159-60. For example, Texas leased Huntsville prison to private 
entrepreneurs who sold convict labor to various businesses. Inmates were mistreated 
and overworked to such an extent that most did not survive more than seven years 
of imprisonment, some attempted suicide, and "others maimed themselves to get out 
of work or as a pathetic form of protest." Id. at 159. 
28. SELLERS, supra note 5, at 50. 
29. Brakel, supra note 21, at 4 n.7. 
30. AMMONS ET AL., supra note 19, at 5. 
31. See Diiulio, supra note 27, at 160 (stating that pressure by unions contributed 
to the decline of prison labor); cf Arie Press, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Private 
Prisons in the 1980s, in PRIVATE PRISONS .AND THE PuBLIC INTEREST, supra note 2, 
at 19, 20-21 (discussing the passage of"state use" laws during the Great Depression, 
under which prisoner-produced products could be used only by the state). 
32. Diiulio, supra note 27, at 160. 
33. AMMONS ET AL., supra note 19, at 5. 
34. Brakel, supra note 21, at 4-5. 
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historically have been managed and owned by private for-profit 
and non-profit groups.35 For example, the federal Bureau of 
Prisons has been sending inmates to private pre-release 
community treatment centers since 1965.36 Furthermore, a 
federal study reveals that, by 1983, forty-nine states had 
contracted with over 1800 private firms to manage juvenile 
centers accommodating approximately 31,000 youths.37 
Real controversy regarding prison privatization, however, did 
not develop until the 1980s, when private entrepreneurs began 
operating entire adult prisons. 38 Probably the most important 
impetus for a renewed interest in private prisons was over-
crowding in the public facilities. 39 According to President 
Ronald Reagan's Commission on Privatization, the combined 
number of federal and state inmates increased by approxi-
mately seventy-four percent between 1979 and 1986.40 Whereas 
one American per thousand was imprisoned in 1970, the rate 
of incarceration had tripled by 1990.41 Although federal, state, 
and local governments budgeted additional funds for correc-
tions, they could not construct new prisons quickly or cheaply 
enough to meet the demand, in part because of continuing 
inflation.42 By 1990, federal prisons were filled to more than 
170% of their rated capacity,43 and forty-one states plus the 
District of Columbia faced court orders or consent decrees to 
improve crowded prison conditions. 44 
At the same time that American prison systems confronted 
unprecedented overcrowding, state and local governments 
encountered fiscal pressures resulting from tax reductions, 
declining federal grant monies, and general economic malaise.45 
35. Id. at 5. 
36. Ellison, supra note 16, at 695 n.61. 
37. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CHILDREN IN CUSTODY: 
1982/83 CENSUS OF JUVENILE DETENTION AND CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES (1983), as 
cited in Press, supra note 31, at 21. Delaware was the only state that did not utilize 
any private firms for juvenile care. Id. 
38. Brakel, supra note 21, at 5. 
39. AMMONS ET AL., supra note 19, at 6. 
40. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON PRlvATIZATION, PRlvATIZATION: ToWARD MORE EFFEC-
TIVE GoVERNMENT 146 (1988) [hereinafter REPORT ON PRIVATIZATION). 
41. AMMONS ET AL., supra note 19, at 6. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 3. 
45. See Douglas C. McDonald, Introduction, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PuBLIC 
INTEREST, supra note 2, at 6-7; see also SELLERS, supra note 5, at 14-15 (suggesting 
that demand for lower taxes and decreased government spending contributes to the 
need for increased privatization). 
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Although citizens demanded tougher penalties against crimi-
nals, the public was often unwilling to pay the higher taxes 
needed to support larger prison populations. 46 Meanwhile, in 
response to complaints of inadequate and costly federal pro-
grams, the Reagan administration advocated the privatization 
of a wide range of government services.47 To economically 
strapped public officials looking for a way out of a hopeless 
situation, prison privatization emerged as an attractive alter-
native.48 
The federal correctional system afforded the first opportunity 
for a private entrepreneur to break into the adult prison 
market. In 1979, the INS began to experience overcrowding in 
its facilities for illegal aliens.49 As a result, it entered into a 
cost-plus contract with Ted Nissen, a former California parole 
and corrections officer who ran a halfway house for state 
inmates, to utilize some ofhis facility's empty beds,50 When the 
shortage of federal beds for detainees continued, Nissen started 
a for-profit private prison company known as Behavioral 
Systems Southwest.51 By1990, Behavioral Systems Southwest 
operated several INS detention facilities and managed a 
number of community treatment centers for the U.S. Bureau 
of Prisons.52 At that time, the INS was contracting with at 
least three other private firms to operate detention centers.53 
Not surprisingly, the federal government began experi-
menting with privatization at what has been termed the 
"shallow end" of the adult corrections system. 54 Incarcerated 
only briefly while awaiting deportation, illegal aliens general-
ly are considered low-security risks who receive little in the 
46. Cikins, supra note 3, at 445-46. 
47. REPORT ON PRIVATIZATION, supra note 40, at xi; McDonald, supra note 45, 
at 4. 
48. Cikins, supra note 3, at 446. See generally E.S. Savas, It's Time to Privatize, 
19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 781 (1992)(advocating that privatization of a city government's 
services would result in improved and less expensive public services, lower taxes, and 
more efficient government). 
49. Press, supra note 31, at 25. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. · LoGAN, supra note 3, at 21-22. 
53. For a sample list of privately contracted prison facilities, including INS and 
Bureau of Prison detention centers, see SELLERS, supra note 5, at 65-68. 
54. MICK RYAN & TONY WARD, PRIVATIZATION AND THE PENAL SYSTEM: THE 
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE AND THE DEBATE IN BRITAIN 27-28 (1989) (describing 
"shallow end" as low-security correctional institutions such as juvenile detention 
facilities and adult halfway houses). 
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way of counseling or rehabilitation. 55 Another type of federal 
facility requiring minimum security care, the Bureau of Pris-
ons' pre-release community treatment centers, has been op-
erated exclusively by private firms since 1981.56 
Following the federal example, many state governments began 
to contract with private firms to manage their prisons in the 
1980s. In 1986, the Marion Adjustment Center in St. Mary's, 
Kentucky, became the first state prison in modern times to be 
privately owned and operated.57 Statistics prepared by the 
University of Florida's Center for Studies in Criminology and 
Law showed that by 1991, private entrepreneurs were running 
forty-three adult prisons in fourteen states, totalling 15,232 
beds.58 According to Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), 
a leading private correctional firm, by 1993 twenty private 
companies managed more than 30,000 beds, representing two 
percent of the total U.S. prison and jail population.59 CCA itself 
operated nineteen prisons nationwide in 1993,60 and by 1994 
CCA had contracted to build and manage facilities in Arizona, 
Florida, and Puerto Rico.61 
By contracting for corrections services, both state and federal 
government officials hope_ to: (1) reduce prison construction and 
operating costs, including the labor expenses associated with 
pensions and benefits; (2) build prison facilities more quickly 
and with fewer bureaucratic delays; and (3) enhance flexibility 
in inmate care without the encumbrance of governmental red 
tape.62 Opponents of privatization, however, contend that: 
(1) private prisons may cost more than public facilities because 
55. Id. at 13. 
56. Hearings on Privatization of Corrections Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil 
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th 
Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 132 (1986) (statement of Norman A. Carlson, Director of the 
Bureau of Prisons). 
57. LoGAN, supra note 3, at 24. Also in 1986, Corrections Corporation of America 
(CCA) unsuccessfully attempted to take over Tennessee's entire prison system. 
McDonald, supra note 45, at 1. For a complete discussion ofCCA's proposal, see David 
H. Folz & John M. Scheb, II, Prisons, Profits and Politics: The Tennessee Privatization 
Experiment, 73 JUDICATURE 98 (1989). 
58. AMMONS ET AL., supra note 19, at 26. 
59. CORRECTIONS CORP. OF AMERICA, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (1994) [hereinafter 
CCA ANNUAL REPORT] (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law 
Reform). 
60. Id. at 15. 
61. CORRECTIONS CORP. OF AMERICA, 1994 FIRST QUARTER REPORT (1994) (on file 
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
62. SELLERS, supra note 5, at 41. For a comprehensive list of the arguments both 
for and against prison privatization, see LoGAN, supra note 3, at 40-48. 
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of hidden costs;63 (2) quality and quantity of prison services 
may decline because of economic pressures to cut corners; and 
(3) by relying on private operators, the government may have 
no means to provide prison services in the event of labor 
strikes, operator bankruptcies, or other emergencies.64 Addi-
tional criticisms of private prisons include political arguments, 
such as the impropriety of using privatization to circumvent 
voters who fail to support prison bond referenda,65 and social 
arguments, such as the claim that private prisons weaken the 
authority of the state in the eyes of both the inmates and the 
public.66 
Most of the social and political issues surrounding prison 
privatization demonstrate the need for accountability. Critics 
of what have been called "prisons for profit"67 fear that without 
adequate standards of accountability, private prison operators 
will have free rein to cut corners and increase their profit 
63. E.g., Joseph E. Field, Note, Making Prisons Private: An Improper Delegation 
of a Governmental Power, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 649, 654-55 (1987) (naming additional 
. contract monitoring and legal fees as examples). Some studies addressing whether 
private prisons are cheaper to run than public prisons have generated inconclusive 
results. See, e.g., Diiulio, supra note 27, at 156 (stating that no reliable cost data exist 
comparing public and private correctional facilities); Dale K. Sechrest & David 
Shichor, Corrections Goes· Public (and Private) in California, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 
1993, at 3, 7 (concluding that results of a cost effectiveness study did not favor either 
privately or publicly operated prisons); cf LoGAN, supra note 3, at 96 (noting that 
simple cost comparisons of public and private prisons may yield inaccurate results 
because they neglect such diversifying factors as location, size, and age of the 
facilities). · 
Other research supports the proposition that private prisons are more cost-effective 
than those operated by the state. AMMONS ET AL., supra note 19, at 19-20 (citing 
reports by the National Institute of Justice and the Urban Institute). For example, 
Martin Sellers compared three public prisons with three private facilities, each similar 
in size, location, structure, age, inmate capacity, average daily occupancy, and 
management style. Additionally, each pair of institutions offered the same quantity 
and type of prison services. Sellers concluded, after identifying as many hidden costs 
as possible, that the private prisons were operated more cost effectively than were 
the public facilities. SELLERS, supra note 5, at 70-93. 
Both supporters and opponents of privatization are awaiting the results of an 
experiment currently underway in Louisiana. That state has constructed three 
identical correctional· centers, one of which will be managed by CCA, one by 
Wackenhut Corrections Corporation, and the third by the state. AMMONS ET AL., supra 
note 19, at 34. Because of the similarities among the three facilities, comparative 
analysis of the costs and quality of care afforded by them should provide more 
accurate data regarding the costs of privatization than do surveys comparing facilities 
with many distinguishing characteristics. 
64. LoGAN, supra note 3, at 45-48. 
65. SELLERS, supra note 5, at 51. 
66. Ira P. Robbins, The Impact of the Delegation Doctrine on Prison Privatization, 
35 UCLA L. REV. 911, 952 (1988). 
67. See, e.g., id. at 912 & n.2. 
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margins by reducing the quantity or quality of services provid-
ed to prisoners.68 When faced with the need to improve the 
bottom line, private entrepreneurs might reduce staff or stint 
on personnel training to the detriment of prisoners.69 Unless 
the government implements some form of monitoring system, 
it will be unable to discover or deter these types of unsavory 
practices. 70 
A related concern involves what Martin Sellers has termed 
the "feather their nest" syndrome. 71 Private contractors need 
many convicts to maintain profitability and to expand prison 
operations. 72 To preserve their inmate populations, these 
entrepreneurs could resort to unethical or unjust policies to 
prolong prison sentences and keep prisoners from being re-
leased on probation.73 Even if the state discovers such un-
scrupulous contractors, critics still fear that private prison 
companies will buy off public officials with bribes, payoffs, and 
kickbacks.74 
Compounding these risks of opportunism among private 
contractors and increasing the difficulties associated with 
accountability is the nature of the prison setting itself. Al-
though taxpayers pay for correctional services, most taxpayers 
do not sample the wares, whether furnished by the state or a 
68. SELLERS, supra note 5, at 52. 
69. Keating, supra note 3, at 131. According to this view, privatization achieves 
most of its touted financial economies by reducing labor costs-a form of union busting 
that results in fewer and less professional prison workers. Craig Becker, With Whose 
Hands: Privatization, Public Employment, and Democracy, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 
88, 91 (1988). Not surprisingly, the presidents of the American Federation of 
Government Employees and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal 
Employees both oppose prison privatization. SELLERS, supra note 5, at 5·9. 
70. Robbins, supra note 2, at 724-25. 
71. SELLERS, supra note 5, at 51. 
72. Most contracts for prison management provide contractors with a per diem 
rate for each inmate incarcerated in the facility. Herman B. Leonard, Private Time: 
The Political Economy of Private Prison Finance, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PuBLIC 
INTEREST, supra note 2, at 66, 79. 
73. SELLERS, supra note 5, at 58. As described by Professor Logan: 
Will the cost-calculating warden revoke a prisoner's good time to gain a little 
"extra" per diem revenue? Or will he bribe inmates with liberal grants of good 
time credit in order to buy their cooperation and to avoid the expense of the 
extra paperwork required by disciplinary proceedings? Or will he decide that it 
is least costly in the long run to govern firmly but fairly and consistently? 
LoGAN, supra note 3, at 69. 
74. SELLERS, supra note 5, at 59. 
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private entity.75 Only prisoners are in a position to judge the 
quality and sufficiency of the services provided, and prisoners 
are neither the most visible nor the most articulate group in 
society. 76 This "hidden delivery"77 problem is exacerbated by the 
fact that average citizens care little about the plight of convicts 
and are unlikely to exert pressure to ensure that prisoners 
receive quality care.78 
While not discounting the need for accountability, Professor 
Charles Logan, a supporter of privatized corrections, argues 
that both public and private prisons should be subject to the 
same standards and supervision. 79 By contracting out for cor-
rectional services, the state does not deny ultimate respon-
sibility for production of those services. Instead, the state 
merely chooses to administer its responsibility through private, 
rather than public, employees. 80 Both government workers and 
private contractors may act dishonestly or unethically, and 
both public and private prisons are secluded from the commu-
nity. 81 Accordingly, prisons should be monitored and ultimately 
subjected to disclosure whether they are run by the state or the 
private sector.82 Professor Logan concedes, however, that both 
private contractors and the government may try to escape 
responsibility for abuses by blaming each other.83 
Some proponents of privatization go one step further, as-
serting that private contractors already may be more account-
able legally, economically, politically, and socially.84 According 
to this argument, private prison companies are subject to 
75. Becker, supra note 69, at 105. 
76. Id. 
77. James T. Gentry, Note, The Panopticon Revisited: The Problem of Monitoring 
Private Prisons, 96 YALE L.J. 353, 356 (1986) (defining "hidden delivery" as a market 
failure occurring when a purchaser of goods or services does not observe consumption 
and thus "cannot accurately gauge the quantity and quality of the product"). 
78. Diiulio, supra note 27, at 164. 
79. LoGAN, supra note 3, at 210. 
80. See id. at 50-52. 
81. See id. at 55-57, 194. 
82. Id. at 204. 
83. Id. at 194-95; see, e.g., Martin Tolchin, Jails Run by Private Company Force 
it to Face Question of Accountability, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1985, atA15. In that article, 
Tolchin quotes the Reverand Roberto Flores of the Houston Center for Immigration 
as saying: "[W]henever we have a problem, [the) I.N.S. tells us to go to [the private 
contractor), and [the private contractor) tells us to go to [the) l.N.S." Id. 
84. LoGAN, supra note 3, at 195-202; see also AMMONS ET AL., supra note 19, at 
14-15 ("Not only are private sector operators monitored by the courts and government 
agencies, they also are scrutinized by the media, civil rights groups, and prison reform 
activists."). 
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marketplace checks that do not exist in the public sector. 85 The 
relative novelty and controversial nature of private prisons has 
drawn media attention, increasing the overall visibility of 
corrections in the public eye.86 Additionally, most government 
contracts for prison operations mandate some type of govern-
ment supervision, such as the use of on-site, state-employed 
monitors.87 Although Professor Logan agrees that prison 
contracts should include provisions requiring some sort of 
monitoring system,88 he decries proposals such as that of Profes-
sor Ira Robbins89 for imposing "double standards" on private and 
public prisons in the name of accountability.90 Professor Logan 
finds it unfair to saddle private prison operators with expensive 
monitoring requirements "far beyond those that exist for govern-
ment prisons."91 . 
Privatization of corrections presents a host of legal issues, 
including questions regarding the government's authority to 
delegate its penal function to private entities.92 Critics of 
private prisons have found constitutional obstacles to such 
delegations because the power to incarcerate implicates the 
due process rights of prisoners.93 Supporters of privatization, 
however, argue that the government achieves its penological 
objectives through private corporations legitimately and con-
85. AMMONS ET AL., supra note 19, at 14. Marketplace checks include economic 
competition for lucrative prison contracts, the threat of contract termination or 
nonrenewal for poor performance, and independent assessments of risk or misman-
agement by investment counselors, shareholders, and liability insurers. LoGAN, supra 
note 3, at 197. 
86. LOGAN, supra note 3, at 202-03. 
87. Id. at 206. 
88. Id. at 65. Logan suggests that these monitors should review contractors' 
"discretionary decisions" regarding complaints of unfair treatment filed by inmates. 
Id. 
89. In 1988, the American Bar Association issued a report prepared by Professor 
Robbins that recommended model legislation and a model contract to guide jurisdic-
tions desiring prison privatization. See generally Robbins, supra note 2, at 612-794 
(providing model contract and statute provisions and detailed commentary regarding 
prison privatization, from financial and physical plant issues to questions of inmate 
management, use of force, indemnification, and government monitoring). 
90. LOGAN, supra note 3, at 146-47. 
91. Id. at 147. 
92. See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 66, at 950 (concluding that courts may find 
government delegations of prison management unconstitutional when disciplinary 
rules are formulated by private parties); cf. Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, 
Law, and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449, 502 n.250 (1988) (predicting that courts will 
not be persuaded that delegation of prison management to private parties is uncon-
stitutional absent specific allegations of abuse). 
93. See, e.g., Field, supra note 63, at 673-74 (arguing that as a matter of fairness 
and equity, only the government should "limit people's freedom"). 
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stitutionally so long as it retains ultimate authority over the 
delegation.94 Although no court has addressed this issue 
directly, some commentators find Medina v. O'Neill95 signifi-
cant.96 In this case, a federal court had an opportunity to find 
private incarceration unconstitutional and did not do so. 97 
To resolve the delegation question at the state level, many 
state legislatures have passed laws authorizing private incar-
ceration. 98 Less clear, however, is whether the federal govern-
ment needs or already has similar statutory authority. No 
comprehensive federal enabling legislation exists as such. By 
not adopting such legislation, Congress has overlooked an 
important opportunity to impose accountability standards on 
federal correctional agencies. 
While no comprehensive federal statute exists, some ob-
servers believe privatization of federal incarceration is pro-
vided by 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b).99 Norman Carlson, the former 
Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, argues that this 
section gives the federal government the authority to privatize 
its prisons.100 Section 3621(b) provides that the Bureau of 
94. E.g., LOGAN, supra note 3, at 60; Ellison, supra note 16, at 693. 
95. 589 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D. Tex. 1984), uacated in part, reu'd in part on other 
grounds, 838 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1988). In Medina, a federal district court found that 
the INS was liable under a "state action" theory for the behavior of a private party 
hired by the INS to detain Colombian stowaways. 589 F. Supp. at 1038. For an 
analysis of the state action doctrine in the private prison context, see Robbins, supra 
note 2, at 577-604. 
Questions concerning the availability of qualified iinmunity to private prison 
personnel for violations of prisoners' civil rights are discussed at length in Charles 
W. Thomas, Resoluing the Problem of Qualified Immunity for Priuate Defendants in 
Section 1983 and Bivens Damage Suits, 53 LA. L. REV. 449 (1992). 
96. See Douglas C. McDonald, When Gouernment Fails: Going Private as a Last 
Resort, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PuBLIC INTEREST, supra note 2, at 179, 181 
(commenting on judges foregoing the opportunity to address the constitutionality of 
prison privatization). But cf. SELLERS, supra note 5, at 55 (construing Medina as 
granting the INS a constitutional right to contract with private parties to detain 
excludable aliens). · 
97. Medina, 589 F. Supp. at 1038. 
98. E.g., TEX. GoV'T CODE ANN. § 495.001 (West Supp. 1995) (authorizing the 
Texas Board of Corrections to "contract with a private vendor ... for the financing, 
construction, operation, maintenance, or management of a secure correctional 
facility"). For a partial list of state enabling statutes, see Robbins, supra note 2, at 
768-71. 
99. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 4082(b) 
(1982)). 
100. Norman A. Carlson, Prison Priuatization, 17 CORRECTIONS DIG. 3 (1986). 
Carlson discusses 18 U.S.C. § 4082(b) (1982), which was the precursor of§ 3621(b). 
The operative language has not changed. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 4082(b) (1982) with 
18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The current statute states: 
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Prisons may designate as a place of confinement any appro-
priate facility "whether maintained by the Federal Govern-
ment or otherwise."101 Under Carlson's view, this language 
acknowledges the federal government's power to delegate 
prison maintenance to private entities.102 At least one 
commentor maintains, however, that Congress intended the 
"or otherwise" clause merely to permit federal offenders to be 
placed in state facilities. 103 After examining the legislative 
history, purpose, and context of the statute, Professor Robbins 
concludes that the statute allows the Bureau of Prisons to 
contract with private entities only for the operation of pre-
release residential community treatment centers.104 According 
to this view, the federal government lacks the necessary 
statutory authority to privatize other types of incarceration 
facilities. 105 
Uncertainty surrounding the legal implications of prison 
privatization led the American Bar Association in 1986 to 
adopt a resolution advising jurisdictions not to contract with 
the private sector for prison management services "until the 
complex constitutional, statutory, and contractual issues are 
developed and resolved."106 Despite these complicated issues, 
however, prison privatization continues to gain momentum on 
both the federal and state level.107 
Continued growth in prison privatization can hardly be 
surprising, considering that the factors that prompted public 
officials to privatize during the 1980s have become more 
The Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place of the prisoner's imprisonment. 
The Bureau may designate any available penal or correctional facility that 
meets minimum standards of health and habitability established by the Bureau, 
whether maintained by the Federal Government or otherwise and whether 
within or without the judicial district in which the person was convicted .... 
Id. § 3621(b) (emphasis added) The only difference between the current provision and 
§ 4082(b) is that the earlier provision requires the Attorney General, not the Bureau 
of Prisons, to designate the place of confinement. 18 U.S.C. § 4082(b) (1982). 
101. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (emphasis added). 
102. Carlson, supra note 100, at 1-5. 
103. Field, supra note 63, at 667-68. 
104. Robbins, supra note 2, at 767. 
105. Id. 
106. SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, REPORT TO THE 
HOUSE OF DELEGATES, Report lllB at 1 (1986). . 
107. Prison privatization has been called a "nationwide trend" by some members 
of the press. E.g., Linda Kleindienst, Florida Adds Privatized Prisons, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL, Mar. 8, 1994, at Cl. 
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pressing. Prison populations, once expected to ease in this 
decade, have swelled. 108 Public sentiment continues to favor 
longer sentences for criminals and disapprove of early release 
programs.109 Current prison facilities continue to age and 
become outdated, necessitating new construction.110 Although 
leaders may have abandoned Reagan era privatization, they 
continue to endorse the concept, while calling for "less gov-
ernment management and more government leadership."111 
Private corrections firms see a lucrative opportunity in these 
attitudes and statistics.112 The Bureau of Prisons maintains 
that it has· the necessary authority to contract with private 
firms for correctional services.113 Recently, the U.S. Marshals 
Service has followed the Bureau of Prison's lead; in 1990, it 
contracted with CCA to manage a maximum-security detention 
center in Leavenworth, Kansas. 114 CCA began operating the 
256-bed institution in June 1992.115 
As private correctional facilities proliferate, we must re-
member past abuse. Inevitably, the legal questions of unau-
thorized delegation, statutory authority, and due process 
surrounding prison privatization circle back to the problem of 
accountability. Only safeguards in the form of government 
standards and supervision will ensure ultimate control of 
108. McDonald, supra note 45, at 8. The number of felons housed in federal 
prisons has grown from 24,500 in 1980 to 76,000 in 1993. By 1993, private facilities 
held an additional 8200 convicts.· Penny Bender, Crowded Prisons Blamed on 
Sentencing Guidelines, Gannett News Service, May 12, 1993, at *2, available in 
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Mags File. The Bureau of Prisons has estimated that by 1999 
the federal system will accommodate 116,000 people. Id. The average number of 
prisoners handled daily by the U.S. Marshals Service has multiplied from 5383 in 
1984 to 20,084 in 1993. Vath, supra note 5, at 33. 
109. LoGAN, supra note 3, at 236; see also Vath, supra note 5, at 320 ("As citizens 
. repeatedly call for locking up more criminals and returning the streets to law-abiding 
people, ... [p)olitical leaders are feeling the heat about early release programs that 
are intended to ease prison overcrowding."). 
110. See McDonald, supra note 45, at 5-6 (reporting that only 21 % of federal 
prisons satisfy the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections standards). Although 
Congress has approved funding for 50,000 additional prison beds, this figure hardly 
accommodates demand. Bender, supra note 108, at *2. 
111. Paul R. Verkuil, Reverse Yardstick Competition: A New Deal for the Nineties, 
45 FLA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1993). 
112. See, e.g., CCA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 59, at 4 ("We intend to pursue 
every opportunity that makes economic sense."). 
113. AMMONS ET AL., supra note 19, at 35 n.11. 
114. Id. at 19; Vath, supra note 5, at 320. 
115. CORRECTIONS CORP. OF AMERICA, FACILITY PROFILES 6 (1994) [hereinafter 
CCA FACILITY PROFILES) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law 
Reform). 
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privatized facilities and protection ofinmates' liberty interests. 
Commentators note that adequate monitoring of private 
prisons will resolve much of the doubt concerning their propri-
ety .116 Even Professor Robbins admits that private prisons may 
be constitutional "if the government properly oversees, re-
views, and circumscribes the private company's authority."117 
Many monitoring systems have been proposed to ensure that 
private prisons are as accountable to the public as are publicly 
operated prisons. 118 Accountability cannot be achieved, howev-
er, without clear standards. In the federal context, where no 
enabling legislation specifically authorizes private prisons to 
create performance criteria, 119 correctional agencies are free to 
create performance criteria for private operators. 
Without predictable legislative standards, the public has 
been effectively shut out of the privatization process. Without 
public awareness, public input regarding the operation of 
private prisons is inadequate. But does the public have equal 
access to information concerning public and private federal 
prisons? To answer that question, it is necessary to consider 
how the FOIA applies to public prisons and to determine 
whether it is relevant to privatized facilities. 
II. FEDERAL PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE FOIA 
Congress passed the FOIA120 in 1966121 as a bipartisan effort 
to open the workings of government to the public. 122 As the 
many administrative agencies created during this century took 
over large areas of government responsibility,123 it became 
116. See, e.g., Gentry, supra note 77, at 358-59. 
117. Robbins, supra note 66, at 915. 
118. See infra text accompanying notes 394-99. 
119. See supra text accompanying notes 98-105. 
120. Freedom oflnformation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified 
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988)). 
121. Although the FOIA was signed into law on July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 
80 Stat. 250 (1966), the legislation did not take effect until one year later. Pub. L. No. 
90-23, § 4, 81 Stat. 54 (1967) (amending the FOIA) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552 (1988)). 
122. KENT R. MIDDLETON & BILL F. CHAMBERLIN, THE LAW OF PuBLIC COMMUNI-
CATIONS 455 (3d ed. 1994). 
123. See HAROLD L. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNow: LEGAL ACCESS TO 
PUBLIC RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS 223 (1953) ("Nearly every phase of our lives and 
business is affected in some way, directly or indirectly, visibly or invisibly, to a greater 
or lesser degree by a maze of federal administrative regulations."). 
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more difficult for citizens to find out "what their government 
[was] up to."124 Although the public records section of the 
Administrative Procedure Act125 (APA) was intended to make 
government records accessible, a 1953 study by Professor 
Harold Cross concluded that the government has used that 
provision's vague wording as authority for withholding records 
from the press. 126 
Congress amended the APA with the FOIA to remedy this 
problem; the FOIA established a policy of "disclosure, not 
secrecy"127 with respect to federal agency records. When sign-
ing the FOIA into law, President Lyndon Johnson emphasized 
the importance of an accessible government: 
This legislation springs from one of our most essential 
principles: a democracy works best when the people have 
all the information that the security of the Nation permits. 
No one should be able to pull the curtains of secrecy 
around decisions which can be revealed without injury to 
the public interest.128 
Government accountability to the public, then, lies at the 
heart of the FOIA. The Act's legislative history makes clear 
that Congress had at least two goals in mind when envisioning 
the FOIA: first, to provide the electorate with the necessary 
information to make informed choices about public policy;129 
124. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 105 (1973) (Douglas, J. dissenting) (quoting Henry 
Steele Commanger, The Defeat of America, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Oct. 5, 1972, at 7). 
125. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 237, 238 (codified at 5 
u.s.c. § 552 (1988)). 
126. See CROSS, supra note 123, at 227-28. For examples of government agencies 
that used the APA to withhold information from the public, see H.R. REP. No. 1497, 
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2422. 
127. Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976). 
128. Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill Revising Public Information 
Provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, July 4, 1966, 2 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. 
Doc. 895 (July 11, 1966). 
129. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1966), reprinted in 
1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2429: 
A democratic society requires an informed, intelligent electorate, and the 
intelligence of the electorate varies as the quantity and quality of its information 
varies. A danger signal to our democratic society in the United States is the fact 
that such a political truism needs repeating. And repeated it is, in textbooks and 
classrooms, in newspapers and broadcasts. 
The repetition is necessary because the ideals of our democratic society have 
outpaced the machinery which makes that society work. The needs of the electorate 
have outpaced the laws which guarantee public access to the facts in Government. 
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and second, "to protect the American public from the evils of 
secret government."130 Permeating both goals is the beliefthat 
public scrutiny of government activity will promote bureau-
cratic accountability.131 Recognizing the value of public access 
to federal agency records, Justice Powell opined that the 
FOIA's purpose is "to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the 
functioning of a democratic society, ... to check against cor-
ruption and to hold the governors accountable to the gov-
erned. "132 
The FOIA seeks to preserve government accountability by 
requiring federal agencies133 to provide three types of infor-
mation to the public. First, agencies must publish in the 
Federal Register basic data, such as descriptions of agency 
organization, explanations of FOIA procedures, and lists of 
persons to contact with FOIA requests. 134 Second, agencies 
must allow the public to inspect and copy "'reading room' 
materials, "135 such as final opinions in adjudicated cases, spe-
cific policy statements, and certain administrative staffmanu-
als.136 Third, and most importantly, agencies must make 
available to "any person" all other records that are properly 
requested, reasonably described, and not otherwise exempt 
from disclosure.137 
Upon receipt of a formal FOIA request, an agency can either 
disclose the relevant records or justify nondisclosure with one 
of nine statutory exemptions.138 Because the FOIA's purpose 
Id. For a detailed analysis and history of the FOIA, see Kenneth C. Davis, The 
Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761 (1967); Jim Smith, 
The Freedom of Information Act of 1966: A Legislative History Analysis, 74 LAW 
LmR. J. 231 (1981). 
130. 112 CONG. REC. 13,660 (1966) (statement of Rep. Matsunaga). 
131. See supra notes 129-30. 
132. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (citations 
omitted). 
133. For the meaning of "federal agency," see infra Part 11.A.1. 
134. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l) (1988). 
135. OFFICE OF INFORMATION & PRIVACY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION ACT GUIDE & PRIVACY ACT OVERVIEW 5 (Pamela Maida ed., Sept. 1994) 
[hereinafter FOIA OVERVIEW]. 
136. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1988). 
137. Id. § 552(a)(3). The agency's disclosure determination must be made without 
regard to the requester's identity or intended use of the information. See NLRB v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1975) ("[R]ights under the Act are 
neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that [the requester] claims an 
interest ... greater than that shared by the average member of the public."). 
138. These exemptions allow agencies to withhold records that pertain to national 
security, internal agency rules, matters exempted from disclosure by other federal 
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is to "open agency action to the light of public scrutiny,"139 the 
Supreme Court has recognized that FOIA exemptions must be 
"narrowly construed."140 Even records that fall within one of 
these exemptions may be disclosed at the agency's discretion, 
unless such disclosure is prohibited by other law. 141 
With respect to federal prisons, the FOIA clearly applies to 
cabinet offices such as the Department of Justice and to the 
agencies that report to it, including the Bureau of Prisons, the 
INS, and the U.S. Marshals Service.142 The last three agencies 
are considered "components" of the Department of Justice, 143 
and as such are governed by the Department's FOIA guide-
lines.144 Each of these agencies has been involved in FOIA 
litigation.145 
This Article considers whether the FOIA applies to federal 
prison records once those prisons are under private manage-
ment. Two inquiries are involved in deciding whether these 
records will be subject to the FOIA. First, it must be deter-
mined whether a private organization operating a federal 
prison is a federal "agency" under the FOIA. If the private 
entity is not considered a federal agency under the FOIA, the 
statutes, trade secrets and confidential commercial information, inter- or intra-agency 
. memoranda, personnel and medical files, law enforcement information, matters 
concerning the operation of financial institutions, and geological information. 
5 u.s.c. § 552(b)OH9) (1988). 
139. Rose, 425 U.S. at 372 (citation omitted). 
140. United States Dep't of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 8 (1988) (citations 
omitted). 
141. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293-94 (1979) (holding that FOIA 
exemptions permit, but do not require, a federal agency to withhold records). For an 
example of a statute that prohibits disclosure, see the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1905 (Supp. V 1993), which forbids agency personnel from disclosing certain kinds 
of confidential information. 
142. 5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (defining "agency" to include "any executive department ... 
or other establishment in the executive branch"). 
143. 28 C.F.R. § 16.l(b)(3), app. I (1994). 
144. 28 C.F.R. § 16 (1994). The INS has published additional FOIA guidelines. 
8 C.F.R. § 103.8 (1994). 
145. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136 (1989) 
(stating that the FOIA requires the Department of Justice to disclose district court 
decisions it receives in the course of litigating tax cases); Powell v. United States 
Bureau of Prisons, 927 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (remanding for further consider-
ation a prisoner's FOIA request for disclosure of the "Central Inmate Monitoring 
Manuar>; Lawyer's Comm. for Human Rights v. INS, 721 F. Supp. 552 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989) (noting that the court would review documents in camera to decide whether the 
INS was justified in claiming FOIA exemptions); Heller v. United States Marshals 
Serv., 655 F. Supp. 1088 (D.D.C. 1987) (ruling that documents sought from the U.S. 
Marshals Service were exempt under the FOIA). 
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question becomes whether the records of that organization 
nevertheless could be considered "agency records." 
A. Does a Private Organization Operating a Federal Prison 
Constitute a Federal "Agency" for the Purposes of the FOIA? 
1. Defining a FOIA Agency-By its terms, the FOIA only 
applies to federal "agencies."146 Because the FOIA originally 
did not define "agency,"147 courts were left to apply the APA's 
definition to FOIA actions. 148 Under the APA, "agency" means 
"each authority of the Government of the United States, 
whether or not it is within or subject to review by another 
agency," not including Congress or the courts.149 
In interpreting the APA's definition of agency, the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Soucie v. 
David150 premised agency status upon an entity's power to act 
independently in a specific area.151 In that case, the court found 
that the Office of Science and Technology (OST), a congression-
ally established unit within the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent, constitUted a federal agency because it independently 
evaluated federal programs.152 According to the court, "the APA 
apparently confers agency status on any administrative unit 
with substantial independent authority in the exercise of 
specific functions. "153 
Four years later, in Washington Research Project, Inc. v. 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 154 the District 
of Columbia Circuit narrowed the Soucie test to one of inde-
146. 5 u.s.c. § 552 (1988). 
147. Freedom oflnformation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (amend-
ing the Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946)). The FOIA was 
enacted as an amendment to the APA. Id. 
148. See, e.g., Washington Research Project, Inc. v. Department of Health, Educ. 
& Welfare, 504 F.2d 238, 245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (discussing the APA's definition of 
agency), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1072-76 
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that the Office of Science and Technology (OST) is an agency 
under the APA and not merely staff to the President). 
149. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1988). Congress and the courts are expressly excluded from 
the APA definition of agency. Id. § 551(1)(A)-(B). 
150. 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
151. Id. at 1073. 
152. Id. at 1075. The court was also influenced by the fact that the OST published 
FOIA guidelines in the Federal Register. Id. 
153. Id. at 1073. 
154. 504 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). 
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pendent decision-making authority. 155 The court held that 
initial review groups (IRGs) comprised of nongovernmental 
consultants hired by the National Institute of Mental Health 
were advisory committees performing staff functions and not 
agencies under the FOIA. 156 The institute used the IRGs to 
evaluate grant applications for scientific research projects, and 
usually followed the IRGs' recommendations with only per-
functory review.157 .Despite the pivotal advisory role played by 
the IRGs in the decision-making process, the court determined 
that the IRGs had not become the "functional equivalent" of 
the government institute because they were not "making its 
decisions for it."158 The decisive factor identified by the court 
in resolving whether an entity is an agency subject to the 
FOIA was "whether [the entity] has any authority in law to 
make decisions."159 
In 1974, Congress amended the FOIA to add the following 
language to the APA definition of "agency": 
For purposes of this section, the term 'agency' ... includes 
any executive department, military department, Govern-
ment corporation, Government controlled corporation, or 
other establishment in the executive branch of the Govern-
ment (including the Executive Office of the President), or 
any independent regulatory agency. 160 
According to the Committee on Government Operations's re-
port on the proposed amendment to the FOIA, the definition 
was enlarged to include entities "which perform governmental 
functions and control .information of interest to the public."161 
The Committee's report further explains that the definition 
was not intended to include "corporations which receive appro-
155. 504 F.2d at 248. 
156. Id. at 246. 
157. Id. at 248. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 248 (emphasis added). One commentator notes that the Washington 
Research court in effect ruled that an entity cannot become the equivalent of an agency 
unless that entity has statutory authority to make decisions for the agency. See Anne H. 
Wright, Note, The Definition of"Agency" Under the Freedom of Information Act as Applied 
to Federal Consultants and Grantees, 69 GEO. L.J. 1223, 1240 (1981). 
160. Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 3(e), 
88 Stat. 1561, 1564 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(0 (1988)). 
161. H.R. REP. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Seas. 8 (1974), reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6267, 6274. 
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priated funds .but are neither chartered by the Federal Gov-
ernment nor controlled by it."162 
Despite the "governmental function" language in the defini-
tion's legislative history, 163 litigation addressing when private 
organizations become agencies for FOIA purposes has focused 
not. on the function performed by the organization, but rather 
on the extent of government control over the entity. In Fors ham 
v. Harris, 164 the leading case, the Supreme Court held that a 
private organization will constitute a federal agency subject to 
the FOIA only ifit is subject to extensive, day-to-day control by 
the government.165 
In Forsham, the Court held that a privately operated organ-
ization receiving federal grants to perform medical research was 
not a federal agency and, therefore, its research data were not 
accessible under the FOIA.166 The research, which resulted in 
proceedings by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to restrict 
the labeling and use of certain drugs in diabetes treatment, was 
funded solely through grants awarded by the National Institute 
of Arthritis, Metabolism, and Digestive Diseases (NIAMDD), a 
subdivision ofHEW.167 Patient records and raw data generated 
by the grantee remained in the private organization's posses-
sion.168 The NIAMDD, however, retained the right to access 
these records under the grant agreement, though it did not 
162. S. CONF. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1974), reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6285, 6293. 
163. For a discussion of the legislative history behind the FOIA definition of 
"agency," see Irwin Memorial Blood Bank of the San Francisco Medical Soc'y v. 
American Nat'l Red Cross, 640 F.2d 1051, 1052-54 (9th Cir. 1981). 
164. 445 U.S. 169 (1980). 
165. Id. at 180 & n.11. 
166. Id. at 171. Because the Forsham appellants did not raise the question of 
whether the grantee was an agency, but rather argued that the data gathered by the 
grantee were "agency records," it has been suggested that the Court's discussion of 
what constitutes an agency for FOIA purposes is dicta. Wright, supra note 159, at 
1235 n. 78. However, this analysis overlooks the Court's reasoning that agency records 
are usually created by federal agencies. Although the Court admitted that records of 
a nonagency could become agency records, 445 U.S. at 181, it concluded that in this 
instance, "Congress excluded private grantees from FOIA disclosure obligations by 
excluding them from the definition of 'agency'." Id. at 179. Therefore, the Court's 
determination that this grantee did not qualify as a federal agency was instrumental 
to its holding that the data were not agency records. 
167. Forsham, 445 U.S. at 171-72. 
168. Id. at 173. 
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exercise this right. 169 The government could even request 
permanent custody of the data but chose not to do so.170 
The Court noted that although the NIAMDD supervised the 
research by conducting on-site visits and requiring periodic 
reports, the "day-to-day administration of grant-supported 
activities" remained in the discretion of the grantee.171 Not-
withstanding that the study was financed entirely with federal 
funds and monitored by the NIAMDD to ensure compliance 
with the grant requirements, the Court determined that "[t]he 
funding and supervision indicated by the facts of this case are 
consistent with the usual grantor-grantee relationship and do 
not suggest the requisite magnitude of Government control."172 
In reaching its decision, the Court looked to the meaning of 
"federal agency" in a non-FOIA context, specifically the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act (FTCA). 173 Additionally, the Court re-
ferred to its decision in United States v. Orleans174 in support 
of the proposition that a grantee must be subject to day-to-day 
supervision by the federal government to become a federal 
agency.175 In Orleans, the Court held that receipt of a federal 
block grant did not make a community action organization an 
agency subject to the FTCA, because the government did not 
exercise day-to-day control of the grantee's activities.176 
Along with the extent of government control over a private 
entity's daily operations and decision-making authority, courts 
also have considered the entity's organizational structure. For 
example, in Rocap u. Indiek, 177 the District of Columbia Circuit 
noted several significant organizational features of the Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) and concluded that 
it was a "Government controlled corporation" subject to the 
FOIA's requirements. 178 The court referred to the FHLMC's 
federal charter, its presidentially appointed board of directors, 




172. Id. at 180 n.11. 
173. Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 843 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 28 U.S.C.). Under the FTCA, the federal government is liable for 
torts committed by its employees acting within the scope of their employment. 28 
u.s.c. § 1346(b) (1988). 
174. 425 U.S. 807 (1976). 
175. Forsham, 445 U.S. at 180 n.11. 
176. Orleans, 425 U.S. at 815. 
177. 539 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
178. Id. at 180-81. 
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for certain purposes, as "indicia of federal involvement and 
control which courts have generally relied upon in determining 
whether an entity is a federal agency."179 These indicia of 
control, combined with the government's close supervision of 
the FHLMC's business transactions, outweighed other factors 
that argued against agency status, such as the FHLMC's lack 
of federally appropriated funds. 180 
Finally, in a case analogous to private prison operators, 
Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, 181 the District of Columbia Circuit held 
that medical peer-review committees are not agencies under the 
FOIA.182 In that case, a non-profit corporation comprised of 
private physicians contracted with HEW to review the necessity 
and quality of medical services reimbursed through the Medi-
care and Medicaid programs.183 These peer review committees 
were required by contract to comply with operational standards 
imposed by statute and HEW's program manual. 184 The trial 
court termed these restrictions as "pervasive procedural re-
quirements."185 The appellate court disagreed, however, holding 
that these controls did not constitute the day-to-day supervision 
requisite for agency status under Forsham. 186 Instead, the court 
reasoned that these requirements were necessary only to ensure 
that government funds had been spent properly and that the 
committees had complied with their HEW contracts.187 The 
court held that by merely providing HEW with their expertise 
under contract, the committee members did not become either 
government employees or part of a government agency.188 
In summary, courts have considered four factors to deter-
mine when a private organization should be treated as an 
agency under the FOIA. First, and most importantly, a private 
entity becomes an agency when its operations are subject to 
179. Id. at 180; cf. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank of the San Francisco Medical Soc'y 
v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 640 F.2d 1051, 1056-58 (9th Cir. 1981) (ruling that the 
Red Cross is not an agency for FOIA purposes despite its federal charter and 
presidentially appointed board, because its staff are not United States employees and 
its operations are not subject to substantial federal control). 
180. Rocap, 539 F.2d at 176, 180. 
181. 668 F.2d 537 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
182. Id. at 544. 
183. Id. at 538-39, 543. 
184. Id. at 541. 
185. Id. at 544. 
186. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 164-76. 
187. Public Citizen, 668 F.2d at 544. 
188. Id. at 543-44. 
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extensive, detailed, and daily control by the federal govern-
ment. 189 Second, the courts may be guided by analogy to the 
definition of agency under the FTCA.190 Third, a private entity 
is more likely to be an agency if it exhibits certain organiza-
tional characteristics of federal agencies, such as holding a 
federal charter or having a presidentially appointed board of 
directors. 191 Finally, several earlier cases suggest that a pri-
vate entity with independent authority to make legally binding 
decisions on behalf of an agency could be considered ·an 
agency.192 
2. Applying the FOIA Definition of Agency to Private Prison 
Operators 
a. The Control Test-A private entity managing a federal 
prison will be considered an agency under the FOIA only if it 
is subject to extensive government control of its daily opera-
tions.193 The contract between the firm and the government 
may indicate a high degree of control because the prison 
management firm must comply with whatever standards and 
supervision that the contract requires.194 Generally, the con-
tracting agency solicits bids for a particular project through a 
request for proposals (RFP) that sets out the agency's specifi-
cations for the project and conditions for employment. 195 
Although many RFPs from the early 1980s contained only 
general requirements, 196 RFPs issued by the INS and the 
Bureau of Prisons have in the past been quite specific.197 INS 
contracts generally require on-site monitoring by INS offi-
189. Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 180 & n.11 (1980). 
190. United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813-15 (1975). For a discussion of the 
definition offederal agency under the FI'CA, see infra text accompanying notes 215-25. 
191. See, e.g., Rocap v. lndiek, 539 F.2d 174, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
192. See, e.g., Washington Research Project, Inc. v. Department of Health, Educ. 
& Welfare, 504 F.2d 238, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); 
Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
193. See supra text accompanying notes 164-76. 
194. As one CCA employee told me, "The contract rules all." Telephone Interview 
with Ramsey Wall, Administrative Assistant, Corrections Corporation of America 
(July 5, 1994); see also Keating, supra note 3, at 140 ("The contract incorporates the 
norms of conduct to which a private contractor will be held."). 
195. Robbins, supra note 2, at 613-14. 
196. JUDITH HACKETT ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ISSUES IN CONTRACTING FOR 
THE PRIVATE OPERATION OF PRISONS AND JAILS 43 (1987). 
197. See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 2, at 613 n.427 (referring to an INS RFP that 
was 98 pages long and a Bureau of Prisons RFP that was 177 pages long). In the 
current INS contracting system, for example, the winning proposal may be "about the 
size of a Sears, Roebuck Christmas catalog" if it entails both building and operating 
a facility. Diiulio, supra note 27, at 162. 
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cials, 198 who carry a copy of the contract as they walk around 
the private facilities, observing contract compliance. 199 
If the contract spells out detailed performance standards 
and subjects the contractor to continuous monitoring, it could 
be argued that the federal government is exercising extensive 
day-to-day control over the contractor's procedures. On the 
other hand, despite providing detailed contract procedures, the 
government may not wield authority over daily prison opera-
tions. Private sector managers are hired to manage prisons; 
they, not the government, control the day-to-day rules of 
prison life. 200 
The proper role for private sector managers in enforcing 
prison discipline has been a topic of debate. The practice 
differs from prison to prison. At least one Bureau of Prisons 
RFP allows staff members of a private halfway house to serve 
on the facility's disciplinary committee.201 And, in 1985, CCA 
employees handled disciplinary cases at the Houston INS 
detention center.202 The degree of the CCA administrator's 
authority was made clear when he told a reporter: "I review 
every disciplinary action .... I'm the Supreme Court."203 
Although Professor Robbins recommends that all disciplinary 
cases in private prisons be determined only by government 
officials,204 others urge that initial disciplinary and classifica-
tion decisions be left to the private managers, subject only to 
government review.205 But even if private prison employees 
could act only as witnesses in government-conducted disci-
plinary hearings, the government could not completely elimi-
nate private operators' discretion to lodge a complaint, ignore 
an incident, or settle some disciplinary matters on their 
own.2os 
In ascertaining whether the federal government exerts daily 
operational control over private correctional facilities suffi-
cient to render such organizations federal agencies under the 
FOIA, the District of Columbia Circuit's analysis in Public 
198. See Diiulio, supra note 27, at 162. 
199. E.g., LoGAN, supra note 3, at 23; Diiulio, supra note 27, at 162. 
200. Field, supra note 63, at 661 (citing Burnham v. Oswald, 342 F. Supp. 880, 
884 (W.D.N.Y. 1972)). 
201. Robbins, supra note 2, at 713 n.847. 
202. Tolchin, supra note 83, at A15. 
203. Id. 
204. Robbins, supra note 2, at 712-13. 
205. E.g., LoGAN, supra note 3, at 70. 
206. Press, supra note 31, at 35. 
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Citizen Health Research Group v. Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare207 is particularly helpful. Like private prison 
managers, the medical peer-review committees in Public Citizen 
had to comply with detailed government contracts.208 According 
to the court, however, the existence of these contracts meant 
not that the federal government controlled the committees' 
activities but rather that the contracts established only the 
terms of employment between private experts and the govern-
ment and a method of monitoring how governmental funds were 
spent.209 Similarly, in Forsham v. Harr.is,210 the grant agree-
ment between the private grantee and the federal agency was 
characterized by the Supreme Court as "just the exercise of 
regulatory authority,"211 rather than "substantial federal super-
vision. "212 
These judicial interpretations of the "control" test.lead to the 
conclusion that courts are unlikely to find private prison oper-
ators sufficiently subject to government regulation of their 
daily affairs to be considered federal agencies under the FOIA. 
Even when prison managers tailor their performance to de-
tailed government contracts, the courts will most probably 
portray these contracts as government regulated, not as 
indicia of an agency relationship. And, according to Forsham, 
this result would not change even if the government retained 
a right of access to prison records or had contractual authority 
to take possession of the records but chose not to exercise it.213 
b. The Federal Torts Claim Act-Private prison operators 
also will not constitute federal agencies pursuant to the 
FTCA's definition of "[f]ederal agency,"214 considering the Su-
preme Court's application of that definition. The FTCA's 
definition of federal agency excludes government contractors215 
207. 668 F.2d 537 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
208. Id. at 544; see supra text accompanying note 184. 
209. Public Citizen, 668 F.2d at 544. 
210. 445 U.S. 169 (1980). 
211. Id. at 180 n.11. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. at 182-86; see supra text accompanying notes 169-70. 
214. 28 u.s.c. § 2671 (1988). 
215. Id. The statute provides: 
As used in this chapter and sections 1346(b) and 2401(b) of this title, the term 
"Federal agency" includes the executive departments, the judicial and legislative 
branches, the military departments, independent establishments of the United 
States, and corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the 
United States, but does not include any contractor with the United States. 
28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1988) (emphasis added). 
276 Univen;ity of Michigan Journal, of Law R,efonn [VOL. 28:2 
and the Court has strictly construed this exclusion. 216 In Logue 
u. United States,217 a Texas county had contracted with the 
federal government to incarcerate federal prisoners.218 The 
contract provided that the county would house prisoners in 
compliance with the Bureau, of Prisons's rules and regulations 
governing visitation rights, mail, medical services, employ-
ment, communications with attorneys, and methods of disci-
pline. 219 After a federal prisoner housed in the county jail 
committed suicide, the federal government was sued under the 
FTCA for negligence. 220 The court focused on whether the 
county jail was a federal agency under the FTCA and thus, 
whether its staff would be considered "employee[s] of the 
Government" under the FTCA. 221 
Under the contract with the county jail, the federal govern-
ment determined the conditions under which its prisoners 
were incarcerated and retained the right to access the facility 
to supervise these conditions.222 Nevertheless, the Court held 
that the day-to-day operations of the jail remained the re-
sponsibility of the county, rather than that of the Bureau of 
Prisons. 223 According to the Court, the federal government's 
role was "limited to the payment of sufficiently high rates to 
induce the contractor to do a good job. "224 Because the federal 
government lacked the authority to physically supervise the 
jail's employees, the county was found to be a contractor under 
the statute, and therefore not a federal agency within the 
meaning of the FTCA. 225 
Although Logue involved a county jail under the FTCA, the 
case's implications to private prison management are reveal-
ing because the Supreme Court has continued to analogize the 
definition of agency under the FOIA to the definition in the 
FTCA.226 First, the Court's holding that the contract in Logue 
did not grant the federal government sufficient control over 
216. See, e.g., Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 527-28 (1973). 
217. 412 U.S. 521 (1973). 
218. Id. at 525. 
219. Id. at 529-30. 
220. Id. at 522, 525. 
221. Id. at 526 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2671). 
222. Id. at 529-30. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 529. 
225. Id. 
226. See supra text accompanying notes 173-76. 
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the jail to make the county an agency under the FTCA sug-
gests that contractual standards governing the operation of 
private prisons are unlikely to satisfy the FOIA's "control" 
test.227 Second, the FTCA's definition of agency specifically 
excludes federal contractors, whether public or private.228 As 
long as the Court continues to interpret the FOIA's definition 
of agency as interchangeable with the FTCA's definition, 229 it 
is hard to imagine that the Court will consider a private 
contractor to be a federal agency under the FOIA when the 
Logue court held that a municipal government entity was not 
a federal agency under the FTCA. 
c. Organizational Structure-The third factor courts have 
used to ascertain whether a private entity is controlled by the 
federal government to the extent that it qualifies as a federal 
agency under the FOIA is the entity's organizational struc-
ture. 230 Because most prison management firms exhibit few of 
the organizational characteristics of a federal agency,231 private 
prison operators will not satisfy this aspect of the "control" test. 
Although a few private prisons are managed by nonprofit 
organizations,232 the giants in the industry are for-profit busi-
ness corporations.233 Unlike the private contractor examined in 
Rocap v. Indiek,234 prison management firms are not federally 
chartered and do not have presidentially appointed boards of 
directors. Unlike federal agencies, these corporations must 
answer to shareholders, a more demanding constituency than 
employees or the general public, and therefore freely pursue 
business opportunities wherever they may lie, including the 
management of both state and local facilities. 235 
d. Pre-FOIA Test of Agency under the APA-Prior to the 
addition of an agency definition to the FOIA in 1974, courts 
227. See supra Part 11.A.2.a. 
228. 28 u.s.c. § 2671 (1988). 
229. See supra text accompanying notes 173-76. 
230. See supra text accompanying notes 177-80. 
231. See LoGAN, supra note 3, at 14 (describing private prisons as closely held, 
publicly traded, or employee owned). 
232. See id. at 18 (describing the Eckerd Foundation, a nonprofit organization, 
which operates the Eckerd Youth Development Center, in Okeechobee, Florida). 
233. See AMMONS ET AL., supra note 19, at 28 (noting that the "industry leaders" 
are CCA and Wackenhut Corrections Corporations). 
234. See supra text accompanying notes 177-80. 
235. For example, in 1994, CCA managed four federal prisons and three detention 
centers that housed both federal and state offenders, in addition to 12 state and local 
prisons, and also co-managed facilities in Australia and Great Britain. See CCA 
FACILITY PROFILES, supra note 115, at 1-7. 
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considered whether a private entity had the authority to make 
legally binding decisions on behalf of an agency to determine 
if a private entity would be subject to the FOIA.236 Arguably, 
if a private prison operator were not subject to sufficient feder-
al control to constitute an agency under Forsham, then it had 
independent authority to make its own decisions. 
Even if the courts continued to apply the independent 
authority test to private prison operators, only rarely would 
they find that the operator maintained this kind of decision-
making ability. While private prison operators may not be 
subject to government control over daily operations, they are 
still subject to contractual provisions and to agency direction 
and review.237 Certainly, prison management firms have no 
statutory authority to make legally binding decisions on behalf 
of federal correctional agencies.238 In this sense, a private 
prison manager is similar to a private firm hired by a federal 
prison to provide laundry services. Were a prison management 
firm held to exercise independent decision-making authority 
on behalf of an agency, then all government contractors should 
be subject to the FOIA. 
Private prison operators, however, differ significantly from 
private companies hired to launder inmates' uniforms-wash-
ing clothes cannot be considered an exclusively governmental 
function. As a matter of policy, private prison operators per-
form exclusively governmental functions when they contract 
with the state to manage prisons.239 Corrections is an integral 
part of the criminal justice system, involving the exercise of 
government authority to deprive citizens and aliens of their 
liberty and to controltheir existence behind bars. 240 In the one 
reported case involving private federal detention,241 a federal 
236. See supra text accompanying notes 146-59. 
237. See supra text accompanying notes 194-97. 
238. See supra note 159. 
239. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 69, at 93 (suggesting that the "sovereign power 
of punishment" is a core public function); Field, supra note 63, at 669 
("[C]onstruction and operation of a prison has traditionally been a government 
responsibility and an indispensable part of the administration of the criminal law."); 
Robbins, supra note 66, at 936 (arguing that incarcerating prisoners is "intrinsically 
governmental in nature"). But see McDonald, supra note 45, at 183 (maintaining 
that historically incarceration has not been an "intrinsically governmental func-
tion"). 
240. See Field, supra note 63, at 669. 
241. Medina v. O'Neill, 589 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D. Tex. 1984), vacated in part, reu'd 
in part on other grounds, 838 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1988); see supra note 95 for a 
description of the case. 
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district court reasoned that the defendants' behavior constitut-
ed "state action" because the power to detain illegal aliens 
falls within the "exclusive prerogative of the State. "242 Like-
wise, the ability to incarcerate criminals is a public function; 
whether it can be delegated to the private sector is a separate 
issue.243 
Although an entity's performance of a public function has 
been suggested as a more appropriate test for determining 
agency status under the FOIA,244 this test is hardly ever used 
by the courts. In a rare instance, a federal district court held 
that the Smithsonian Institution was an agency subject to the 
FOIA in part "because [the Smithsonian] performs governmen-
tal functions as a center of scholarship and national museum 
responsible for the safekeeping and maintenance of national 
treasures."245 The court, however, also based its decision on 
the Smithsonian's organizational structure-its federal char-
ter, federal funding, and civil service employees. 246 
According to the prevailing judicial interpretations discussed 
above, private prison management firms under contract to the 
federal government are unlikely to be considered agencies for 
FOIA purposes even though they "perform governmental func-
tions and control information of interest to the public."247 
B. Do Records Created by a Private Prison Operator 
Constitute "Agency Records" Subject to FOIA Disclosure? 
1. The FOIA's Definition of Agency Records-While private 
prison operators may not be federal agencies under the FOIA 
according to the courts, their records may nevertheless consti-
tute agency records. Before materials can be obtained from an 
agency under the FOIA, the desired information first must 
242. 589 F. Supp. at 1038. 
243. See supra text accompanying notes 92-105. 
244. See Wright, supra note 159, at 1225. But cf. Edward C. Walterscheid, Access 
to Federally Funded Research Data Under the Freedom of Information Act, 15 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 59 (1989) (warning that any test allowing federally funded 
research data to be available under the FOIA would hurt U.S. economic competitive-
ness). 
245. Cotton v. Adams, 798 F. Supp. 22, 24 (D.D.C. 1992). 
246. Id. 
247. H.R. REP. No. 876, supra note 161, at 8, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
6274. 
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have been memorialized in the form of a record. 248 More 
precisely, the FOIA only applies to "agency records," although 
the FOIA never defines that term.249 The term implies, how-
ever, the existence of some connection between the requested . 
record and a federal agency.250 In a trio of leading cases, the 
Supreme Court has established that an agency must have 
custody and control of records to create a sufficient nexus for 
a finding of agency record status. 
In Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 
Press,251 the Court held that the FOIA requires an agency to 
disclose only the documents that it has "created and re-
tained."252 In that case, FOIA requests had been filed with the 
Department of State for notes of Henry Kissinger's telephone 
conversations when he was Secretary of State and Assistant 
to the President for National Security Affairs.253 Before two of 
the requests were filed, Kissinger had donated the material to 
the Library of Congress, which is not an agency subject to the 
FOIA.254 The Court held that in refusing to honor these two 
FOIA requests, the Department of State had not improperly 
withheld agency records because the Department neither 
possessed nor controlled the documents at the time the re-
quests were made.255 Furthermore, the Court held that federal 
agencies have no obligation to retrieve documents that are no 
longer in their custody.256 
248. For a discussion of the physical characteristics of records under the FOIA, 
see Ann H. Wion, Note, The Definition of "Agency Records" Under the Freedom of 
Information Act, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1093, 1095-98 (1979) (noting that courts have held 
that film, audio tape, and computer data are records and arguing that even materials 
not designed to store information should constitute records under the FOIA if they 
contain information that "a citizen might want to know"). 
249. The FOIA's disclosure provision applies to "records," 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1988), · 
but its enforcement provision refers to "agency records," 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1988). 
In Forsham v. Harris, the Court stated that "[s]ince the enforcement provision of the 
Act . . . refers only to 'agency records' it is certain that the disclosure obligations 
imposed ... were only intended to extend to agency records." 445 U.S. 169, 178 n.8 
(1980). 
250. In Forsham, the Court noted that "[t]he use of the word 'agency' as a modifier 
demonstrates that Congress contemplated some relationship between an 'agency' and 
the 'record' requested under the FOIA." 445 U.S. at 178. 
251. 445 U.S. 136 (1980). 
252. Id. at 152. 
253. Id. at 142-43. 
254. Id. at 154-55. 
255. Id. at 155. 
256. Id. at 139 ("We hold today that even if a document requested under the FOIA 
is wrongfully in the possession of a party not an 'agency,' the agency which received 
the request does not 'improperly withhold' those materials by its refusal to institute 
a retrieval action."). 
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In addition, the Court stressed that mere possession of a 
record by an agency is not sufficient to create an agency record 
subject to the FOIA. In a third FOIA request, a columnist 
sought notes of telephone conversations made by Kissinger 
when he was National Security Adviser that· were kept in 
Kissinger's office at the Department of State.257 Notwithstand- . 
ing the fact that this request was made after the materials 
were transferred to the Library of Congress,258 the Court held 
that they were not agency records subject to FOIA disclosure.259 
Kissinger made the notes as a presidential advisor. The Court 
concluded that the notes, as presidential papers, were excluded 
from the FOIA.260 Although Kissinger stored the notes at the 
Department of State, the Court emphasized that the Depart-
ment of State neither created nor controlled them:261 "We 
simply decline to hold that the physical location of the notes of 
·telephone conversations renders them 'agency records.' "262 
The second case, Forsham v. Harris,263 involved records of a 
nonagency that an agency did not possess, but were arguably 
subject to an agency's control.264 In Forsham, the Court as-
serted that possession in addition to control was required for 
materials to be agency records.265 Forsham involved research 
data generated by private grantees under a federal research 
grant. 266 The grantees maintained custody of the data and 
submitted only research summaries to the government.267 
Although the government retained the right to take possession 
of the data, it never exercised that right.268 HEW, the grantor 
agency, refused to honor a FOIA request for the data in part 
because it believed the information belonged to a private 
organization. 269 
257. Id. at 143-44. 
258. Id. at 142. 
259. Id. at 155. 
260. Id. at 156 (explaining that the FOIA's legislative history reveals that the 
"Executive Office" does not include the Office of the President). 
261. Id. at 157. 
262. Id. 
263. 445 U.S. 169 (1980). 
264. For the information at issue in Forsham, see supra text accompanying 
notes 166-72. 
265. Forsham, 445 U.S. at 182. 
266. Id. at 171-77. 
267. Id. at 172-73. 
268. Id. at 173. 
269. Id. at 176. 
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The Court agreed with HEW, holding that the data were not 
agency records because they had been "generated" by a private 
organization and had never been "obtained" by an agency.270 
Discerning a "possessory emphasis" in the Act's legislative 
history,271 the Court stated that "the FOIA applies to records 
which have been in fact obtained, and not to records which 
merely could have been obtained. "272 The Court reasoned that 
requiring the agency to respond to the FOIA request by exer-
cising its right of access to the data would be the same as 
forcing an agency to "create" a record. 273 According to Forsham, 
then, an agency must have actual physical possession of a 
document for it to become an agency record. Neither an agen-
cy's right to possession nor its use of a privately created docu-
ment is enough. 274 
In the third case, Department of Justice v. Tax Analysts,215 
the Court reemphasized possession and control as the touch-
stones of agency record status when records are created by a 
nonagency. In that case, the publisher of a weekly tax maga-
zine filed a FOIA request with the Department of Justice to 
obtain district court tax opinions and final orders used by the 
Department in litigating tax cases.276 In holding that the court 
opinions were subject to FOIA disclosure, the Court outlined 
a two-part test for determining when records qualify as agency 
records. First, an agency must "either create or obtain" the 
requested materials,277 and second, the agency must control 
those materials at the time the FOIA request is made.278 
For an agency to have control over a record, the Court ex-
plained, "the materials [must] have come into the agency's 
possession in the legitimate conduct of its official duties,"279 and 
must not include personal papers belonging to agency employ-
ees.280 The Court noted that if agency records were limited to 
those created by the agency, such a definition would violate the 
FOIA's purpose of "giving the public access to all nonexempted 
270. Id. at 178. 
271. Id. at 185. 
272. Id. at 186. 
273. Id. 
274. Id. at 182. 
275. 492 U.S. 136' (1989). 
276. Id. at 139. 
277. Id. at 144 (quoting Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 182 (1980)). 
278. Id. at 145. 
279. Id. 
280. Id. 
WINTER 1995] Accountability in Privatized Federol Corrections 283 
information received by an agency as it carries out its man-
date. "281 The Court dismissed the Department of Justice's 
argument that materials created outside of an agency should be 
accessible under the FOIA only if they were created for the 
purpose of assisting agency decision making, holding that the 
FOIA did not qualify disclosure on the intent of those who draft 
records. 282 
2. The FOIA's Definition Applied to Privatized Prisons-
Kissinger, Forsham, and Tax Analysts have many ramifications 
for private prisons operated pursuant to federal government 
contracts. A private prison operator creates or is a party to at 
least two types of documents. First, the prison management 
firm and the agency enter into a contract governing all aspects 
of prison operations. This contract may consist of the agency's 
RFP and the winning bidder's response,283 and may include 
various amendments over time. 284 Second, most prison manag-
ers are required by the contract to submit periodic summaries 
and incident reports to the contracting agency.285 Finally, prison 
managers create and maintain their own internal records 
system. 
The first two types of documents-the contract with the 
agency and any periodic or incident reports provided to the 
agency-are within the agency's possession and control. Ac-
cording to Forsham, records created by nonagencies become 
agency records upon transfer to an agency subject to the 
FOIA.286 Prison records created by a private management firm 
that are obtained by a federal agency, therefore, will be sub-
ject to FOIA disclosure. However, if the government only 
reserves a contractual right to possess prison records but does 
281. Id. at 147. 
282. Id. 
283. See supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text. 
284. See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 2, at 649 n.582 (discussing an amendment to 
the CCA's Hamilton County, Tennessee Contract that reduced its general liability 
insurance made within two years of the initial contracting); see also HACKETT ET AL., 
supra note 196, at 42 (reporting that Hamilton County has a 32-year contract). 
285. See HACKETT ET AL., supra note 196, at 43. Periodic summaries are regular 
reports filed on a monthly, quarterly, or annual basis. Incident reports, on the other 
hand, deal with more unusual events at the facility, such as inmate violence, prisoner 
death, or attempted escape. Id. 
286. Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 185-86 (1980); see supra text accompanying 
notes 270-74; see also Weisbergv. United States Dep't of Justice, 631F.2d824 CD.C. 
Cir. 1980) (holding that copyrighted photographs voluntarily submitted to the Depart-
ment of Justice by private company are agency records). 
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not actually take custody of them, Fors ham mandates that the 
documents are not agency records. 287 
Even if an agency actually takes possession of certain pri-
vate prison records, these documents may fall within one of 
the FOIA exemptions. The FOIA exemption invoked most 
frequently with respect to records transferred to agencies by 
government contractors is the fourth exemption (Exemption 
4),288 which protects "trade secrets and commercial or financial 
information obtained from a person [that is] privileged or 
confidential. "289 Exemption 4 was designed to protect both the 
government and businesses that provide proprietary informa-
tion to federal agencies by encouraging businesses to submit 
voluntarily information upon which the government may rely 
in making "intelligent, well informed decisions."290 
Courts have disagreed about the meaning of the term 
"trade secrets" as used in Exemption 4. 291 Some have held 
that trade secrets encompass any information used in a busi-
ness that provides a competitive advantage. 292 In 1983, how-
ever, the District of Columbia Circuit adopted a more narrow 
definition of the term, holding that trade secret includes only 
"a secret, commercially valuable plan, formula, process, or 
device that is used for the making, preparing, compounding, 
or processing of trade commodities and that can be said to be 
the end product of either innovation or substantial effort."293 
Under this interpretation, trade secrets must relate directly 
to manufacturing or production. This less expansive defini-
tion appears to be gaining acceptance. In 1990, it was adopt-
ed by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which held 
287. Forsham, 445 U.S. at 186; see supra text accompanying notes 270-72. 
288. See Thomas M. Susman, Risky Business: Protecting Government Con.tract 
Information. Under the Freedom of Information. Act, 16 PUB. CONT. L.J. 15, 20 (1986) 
(discussing the business information exemption currently codified at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(4) (1988)). 
289. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1988) (Exemption 4). 
290. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 
1974). 
291. See generally FOIA OVERVIEW, supra note 135, at 104-05 (discussing 
conflicting judicial interpretations of Exemption 4). 
292. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 542 F.2d 1036, 1044 (9th 
Cir. 1976) (defining "trade secret[s]• to include a "compilation of information which 
is used in one's business, and which gives ... an opportunity to obtain an advan-
tage over competitors"). 
293. Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Food and Drug Admin., 704 F.2d 
1280, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 198~). 
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that it was more consistent with the FOIA's general purpose 
than the broader definition.294 · 
Because prison management generally does not involve the 
manufacturing or production of goods, private prison operators 
are more likely to invoke the confidential commercial informa-
tion prong of Exemption 4 than they are the trade secret 
prong.295 Information other than trade secrets falls within 
Exemption 4 if it is "(l) commercial or financial, (2) obtained 
from a person, and (3) privileged or confidential."296 
. Courts have construed "commercial or financial" broadly, 
stating that records are possibly commercial if the submitter 
could have a conceivable commercial interest in them.297 Simi-
larly, the requirement that information be obtained from a 
"person" is easily satisfied. The term "person" has been held to 
include a wide variety of entities other than the U.S. Govern-
ment, including corporations298 and foreign government agen-
cies.299 
Whether information submitted to a federal agency qualifies 
as confidential under Exemption 4 has generated substantial 
litigation.30° For almost twenty years, the leading case on this 
issue was National Parks & Conservation Association v. Mor-
ton.301 In National Parks, the District of Columbia Circuit 
established that records are confidential within Exemption 4 
if disclosure would be likely either "(l) to impair the Govern-
ment's ability to obtain necessary information in the future; or 
(2) to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the 
person from whom the information was obtained."302 
294. Anderson v. Department of Health and Human Serv., 907 F.2d 936, 944 
(10th Cir. 1990). 
295. But cf. Diiulio, supra note 27, at 162 (characterizing prison management 
contract proposals as "trade secrets"). 
296. Public Citizen, 704 F.2d at 1290 (citing National Parks & Conservation Ass'n 
v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). 
297. Id. (citing Washington Research Project, Inc. v. Department of Health, Educ. 
& Welfare, 504 F.2d 238, 244 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). 
298. See, e.g., Allnet Communications Serv., Inc. v. FCC, 800 F. Supp. 984, 988 
(D.D.C. 1992). 
299. E.g., Comstock Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Export-Import Bank, 464 F. Supp. 804, 
806-07 (D.D.C. 1979). 
300. E.g., Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Consumers Union v. 
Veterans Admin., 301 F. Supp 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
301. 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
302. Id. at 770 (citation omitted). The court reserved the question as to whether 
additional governmental interests, such as compliance or program effectiveness, 
might be included under the "confidential" µrong of Exemption 4. Id. at 770 n.17. 
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In 1992, the District of Columbia Circuit sitting en bane 
revised the National Parks test in Critical Mass Energy Project 
v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.303 By a vote of seven to 
four,304 the court reaffirmed the general principle of the Na-
tional Parks test, but limited its application to information that 
persons are required to provide to the government.305 The court 
formulated an entirely new test for information voluntarily 
submitted to federal agencies, holding that such information is 
confidential under Exemption 4 "if it is of a kind that would 
customarily not be released to the public by the person from 
whom it was obtained. "306 The court reasoned that when an 
entity is required to provide information to a federal agency, 
Exemption 4 protects the government's interest in ensuring 
that the information remains reliable.307 On the other hand, 
when an entity furnishes proprietary information to an agency 
voluntarily, Exemption 4 encourages continued cooperation with 
the government.308 According to the court, those who willingly 
provide the government with confidential information are likely 
to refuse future cooperation if agencies disclose such informa-
tion to the public.309 Therefore, commercial information that has 
been provided voluntarily to an agency may be withheld with-
out a showing of likely government impairment or substantial 
competitive harm to the provider if the information is of the 
kind not customarily disclosed to the public. 31° Furthermore, the 
agency. invoking Exception 4 bears the burden of proof in 
showing the provider's custom. 311 
With respect to records furnished by a prison management 
firm to an agency, the applicable test under Exemption 4 
depends on whether the prison operator submits the informa-
tion willingly or pursuant to the contract. Presumably, federal 
prison management contracts will require operators to file 
periodic reports, in which case the two-part National Parks 
303. 975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1579 (1993). 
304. The dissenting opinion took a more functional approach to applying Exemp-
tion 4 by advocating disclosure of the requested reports "to advance public under-
standing of the nature and quality of the NRC's [Nuclear Regulatory Commission's] 
oversight operations or activities." Id. at 885 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
305. Id. at 872. 
306. Id. at 879. 
307. See id. at 878. 
308. Id. 
309. Id. (citing National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 768 
(D.C. Cir. 1974)). 
310. Id. 
311. Id. 
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test applies.312 Under the first part of that test, the "impair-
ment" prong, the Critical Mass court recognized that circum-
stances may exist where disclosure could impair the reliability 
of data that are required to be submitted.313 In other words, an 
agency may properly withhold compelled commercial informa-
tion by demonstrating that FOIA disclosure will diminish the 
reliability of what is supplied. For example, an agency could 
withhold a prison management firm's monthly reports stipu-
lated by contract if it determined that FOIA disclosure would 
result in less accurate reports in the future. 
An agency may also withhold compelled confidential infor-
mation under the second part of the National Parks test, the 
"competitive harm" prong, if disclosure would cause substan-
tial competitive injury to the provider.314 In making this 
determination, courts have examined each situation on a case-
by-case basis.315 Actual competitive harm from the disclosure 
need not be shown; courts have held that the existence of 
competitors, in addition to a showing of the likely substantial 
injury, will suffice.316 Courts have recognized many different 
kinds of competitive injury.317 For example, protected informa-
tion may include actual cost data and break-even calculations 
in a government contract situation.318 Whether a private 
prison operator could rely on the "competitive harm" prong to 
justify an agency's withholding of records would depend on the 
operator's position in the marketplace and the manner in 
312. See supra text accompanying note 302. 
313. Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975 F.2d 871, 
878 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1579 (1993). 
314. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 12,600, agencies must notify providers of 
confidential commercial information that the agency may be required to disclose such 
information. The executive order allows providers a reasonable amount of time to 
object to disclosure. Exec. Order No. 12,600, 3 C.F.R. 235 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552 (1988). 
The Supreme Court has recognized the right of a business to challenge the 
disclosure of commercial information under the AP A if the release of the records is 
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law." Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 317-18 (1979) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706). 
315. FOIA OVERVIEW, supra note 135, at 125. 
316. Gulf & Western Indus. v. United States, 615 F.2d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
But cf. Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 878 (suggesting that the commercial threat must 
be more significant to withhold compelled information than to withhold voluntary 
information because with compelled information, there is no presumptive threat to 
government interests). 
317. See FOIA OVERVIEW, supra note 135, at 131-32 n.174-83. 
318. E.g., Gulf & Western Indus., 615 F.2d at 530. 
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which the desired records reveal the conduct or planning of 
the operator's business.319 
Even if an agency has a contractual right to certain prison 
records, an agency's unexercised ability to compel submission 
does not preclude a finding that the records were "voluntarily" 
provided to the agency.320 In Critical Mass, the Institute for 
Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), a private, nonprofit corpo-
ration comprised of nuclear power operators, voluntarily 
transferred safety reports to the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion (NRC) pursuant to the NRC's agreement not to release 
the reports to third parties without the INPO's consent.321 Al-
though the INPO was not subject to NRC regulation, its 
members were.322 Therefore, the NRC could have compelled 
submission of the safety reports directly from the INPO mem-
bers; however, the NRC had no need to do so, preferring, 
instead, to receive them voluntarily from the INP0.323 The 
requester sought disclosure of the reports under the FOIA, 
arguing that the court's new test for voluntarily submitted 
information would allow the industry to avoid the FOIA by 
"volunteering" information the government already had a right 
to receive.324 The court rejected this argument, saying there is 
"no provision in the FOIA that obliges agencies to exercise 
their regulatory authority in a manner that will maximize the 
amount of information that will be made available to the 
public through that Act."325 The court refused to disturb what 
it considered to be the NRC's discretion in choosing the best 
way to procure the information it required.326 
As a result, theoretically, a prison operator could submit 
operations reports on.a voluntary basis, even though its con-
tract gave the agency the power to compel production of the 
same reports. By providing the information voluntarily, records 
319. See, e.g., Professional Review Org. of Florida v. Department of Health & 
Human Serv., 607 F. Supp. 423, 425-26 (D.D.C. 1985) (ruling that records pertaining 
to government contract were properly withheld under Exemption 4 because they 
related to the manner in which the contractor proposed to conduct business under 
contract). 
320. Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 880. 
321. Id. at 874. 
322. Id. 
323. Id. 
324. See id. at 880. 
325. Id. 
326. Id. 
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would be confidential under Exemption 4 so long as they were 
of a kind the operator customarily withheld from the public. 327 
Will the initial contract governing prison operations be 
subject to disclosure under the FOIA? Although prison man-
agement firms elect to respond to RFPs, this fact alone should 
not determine whether the resulting contract is submitted 
voluntarily for the purposes of the Critical Mass test. Instead, 
courts should consider whether the proposal and any addition-
al contract information was required to be submitted by those 
bidders who chose to participate in the bidding process.328 
Regardless of whether the Critical Mass test or the National 
Parks test is used, prison management contracts probably are 
·protected from FOIA disclosure by Exemption 4 because 
allowing public scrutiny of a winning proposal would probably 
also cause substantial competitive harm to the prison opera-
tor. If the contract became available to the public, other prison 
management firms would be iri a position to alter their own 
procedures or to outbid the operator at contract renewal 
time.329 Furthermore, the agency's ability to attract innovative 
prison management proposals could be impaired if winning 
proposals were subject to FOIA disclosure. 33° Certain portions 
of prison management contracts, however, should be available 
under the FOIA for public scrutiny pursuant to the Act's 
requirement that "[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a 
record" be released after application of the appropriate exemp-
tions.331 Segregable contract provisions should include any 
matters that, if disclosed, would not provide competitors with 
proprietary information. Disclosable terms should include 
monitoring and reporting requirements, although no reported 
case has so held. 
With respect to internal prison records created and main-
tained by a private management firm, Kissinger and Forsham 
establish that such documents will not constitute agency 
327. See supra text accompanying notes 309-11. 
328. See FOIA OVERVIEW, supra note 135, at 112-19 (discussing the Critical Mass 
test and stating the Department of Justice's disclosure guidelines). 
329. See, e.g., Gulf & Western Indus. v. United States, 615 F.2d 527, 530 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979) (holding that contract information was properly withheld because it would 
allow competitors to undercut a contractor's bid). 
330. See, e.g., Orion Research, Inc. v. EPA, 615 F.2d 551, 554 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980) (holding that a technical proposal was properly withheld 
because disclosure would have "chilling effect" on willingness of potential bidders to 
submit proposals). 
331. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b) (1988). 
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records for FOIA purposes.332 Internal documents regarding 
daily prison operations kept by the private firm are neither 
created by nor within the possession of an agency.333 Even if 
the contract gives the agency a right to access or ultimate 
possession of these records, Forsham held that an unexercised 
right to control records will not suffice to make them agency 
records under the FOIA.334 
In Forsham, Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion joined 
by Justice Marshall, argued that agencies should not be allowed 
to evade FOIA disclosure on technicalities, such as whether an 
agency has possession of documents that are of interest to the 
public.335 Instead, Justice Brennan would consider two factors 
in determining when a record constitutes an agency record: 
(1) the importance of the record to the public's understanding 
of agency action and (2) the nexus between the agency and the 
record.336 Under this test, if access to the record would increase 
public awareness of government operations, rather than the 
internal affairs of the nonagency, then the legislative intent 
behind the FOIA suggests that the record should be available 
for public scrutiny.337 Justice Brennan also premised disclosure 
on the requirement that the agency use or rely upon the record 
as "part of the regulatory process."338 Justice Brennan, however, 
maintained that the majority's possession test for agency record 
status undermines the FOIA's purpose because "[g]overnment 
by secrecy is no less destructive of democracy if it is carried on 
within agencies or within private organizations serving agen-
cies."339 
Several commentators also have criticized the Court's reli-
ance on possession as the key to agency record status, sug-
gesting instead that the Court take a broader approach.340 
332. See supra text accompanying notes 251-74. 
333. See supra text accompanying note 252. 
334. See supra text accompanying notes 270-74. 
335. Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 188 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
336. Id. at 188-89. 
337. Id. at 189. 
338. Id. at 190. 
339. Id. at 190. 
340. See, e.g., Marie V. O'Connell, Note, A Control Thst for Determining •Agency 
Record" Status Under the Freedom of Information. Act, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 611, 612 
(1985) (advocating a control test for determining when a document is an agency 
record); Wion, supra note 248, at 1095 (arguing that the definition of agency record 
should comport with the full disclosure policy underlying the FOIA); Wright, supra 
note 159, at 1242-55 (arguing either that courts should consider private entities that 
perform government functions as agencies under the FOIA or that Congress should 
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Generally, these commentators agree with Justice Brennan 
that an arbitrary possession standard defeats the FOIA's 
purpose of allowing public access to government information. 
Lower courts, however, have not responded to these argu-
ments.341 
Ultimately, prison records created and maintained by pri-
vate prison management firms are unlikely to be considered 
agency records and therefore will not be subject to the FOIA. 
This will be the case even if the agency retains a right to 
inspect or take possession of the records, as long as actual 
custody of the documents stays with the private operator.342 
Records transferred to the agency will be considered agency 
records subject to the FOIA;343 however, they may be protected 
from disclosure under Exemption 4.344 Under the Critical Mass 
test, prison records that are submitted voluntarily to an 
agency will be exempt if they are of the kind not customarily 
provided by the operator to the public.345 Records that are 
required to be provided to the agency will be exempt if their 
release would likely impair the agency's ability to obtain 
reliable information in the future or cause substantial com-
petitive harm to the provider.346 Under either test, the contract 
between the operator and the agency will be at least partially 
exempt from disclosure. 347 
" 
amend the FOIA to broaden the definition of agency records). But cf. Walterscheid, 
supra note 244, at 59 (suggesting that failure to restrict the definition of agency 
records to exclude federally funded research data in the possession of nonagencies 
undermines American economic competitiveness). 
341. See, e.g., Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975 
F.2d 871, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (explaining that the FOIA does not obligate agencies 
to maximize information available to the public under the Act); see also Animal Legal 
Defense Fund v. Secretary of Agriculture, 813 F. Supp. 882, 891-92 (D.D.C. 1993) 
(citing Critical Mass for the proposition that regulations allowing a private entity to 
retain possession of plans "on-siten and thus not disclose the information does not 
violate the FOIA). 
342. See supra notes 263-74 and accompanying text. 
343. See supra notes 275-82 and accompanying text. 
344. See supra notes 288-90 and accompanying text. 
345. See supra notes 303-11 and accompanying text. 
346. See supra notes 314-19 and accompanying text. 
347. See supra notes 325-31 and accompanying text. 
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III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS 
Over the past fifteen years, the FOIA has been criticized for 
subjecting private entities to what is arguably unfair scrutiny 
by competitors, shareholders, lawyers, and others who use the 
Act for private gain rather than for the public good.348 Critics 
have described the FOIA as "a lawful tool of industrial espio-
nage,"349 used by savvy business executives and their corporate 
attorneys to file thousands ofFOIA requests annually in order 
to learn what their competition, rather than their government, 
is up to.350 Such critics claim that the business community's 
self-serving use of the FOIA defeats the Act's purpose and 
violates the privacy interests of nongovernmental entities that 
are required to submit confidential information to the govern-
ment.351 One commentator recently suggested a remedy that 
would have the Supreme Court limit FOIA disclosure to 
records dealing with governmental, rather than private, activ-
ities.352 
Privatization of federal prisons presents the flip side of this 
same argument. While the FOIA may mandate disclosure of 
too much information concerning the nongovernmental activi-
ties of private entities, it mandates disclosure of too little 
information when private companies perform governmental 
348. See, e.g., Fred H. Cate et al., The Right to Privacy and the Public's Right to 
Know: The "Central Purpose• of the Freedom of Information Act, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 
41, 43-44 (1994) (discussing the use of the FOIA by business persons to access 
information on competitors). 
349. Stephen S. Madsen, Note, Protecting Confidential Business Information from 
Federal Agency Disclosure After Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 80 COLUM. L. REv.109, 113 
(1980) (discussing the use of the FOIA by businesspersons to access information on 
competitors). 
350. Most FOIA requests are made by businesses, including foreign corporations, 
seeking information about their competitors. See, e.g., MIDDLETON & CHAMBERLIN, 
supra note 122, at 4 70 (finding that more than half of all FOIA requests are filed by 
businesses seeking information about government regulations and their competitors); 
Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act: A Short Case Study in the Perils 
and Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMORY L.J. 649, 665-67 (1984) 
(reporting that four out of five FOIA requests are made by business executives or 
their attorneys). 
351. See Cate et al., supra note 348, at 44. 
352. Id. at 67-68; see also Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 189 (1980) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) ("If, for instance, the significance of the record is limited to under-
standing the workings of the nonagency, the public has no FOIA-protected interest 
in access."). 
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functions, such as the operation and management of correc-
tional facilities. When a federal agency delegates a public 
function to a private contractor, the agency, in effect, frus-
trates the purpose of the FOIA. Records created through the 
performance of a public duty that would have been available 
to the public but for the delegation become insulated from 
disclosure by virtue of the contractor's nonagency status. This 
circumvention of the Act is especially troublesome in the 
context of private prisons, where prisoners' liberty interests 
and well-being are at stake. According to the accountability 
principle,353 private prisons should be just as accountable as 
public prisons. To meet this goal, the prisoners, the press, and 
the public must be able to scrutinize the activities of private 
contractors, just as they already may scrutinize public correc-
tional activities under the FOIA. The remainder of this Article 
considers three approaches to the accountability problem and 
concludes that Congress should enact legislation subjecting 
federal prison records that are created and maintained by 
private management firms to disclosure under the FOIA as 
part of a comprehensive program to guard against contractor 
abuse. 
A. Insisting on Intensive Government 
Monitoring of Private Prisons · 
As noted earlier in this Article, both critics and supporters of 
prison privatization agree that private prison operators must be 
held accountable for the way they perform their delegated 
duties. 354 Various monitoring schemes have been proposed, most 
involving document review and on-site prison inspections 
conducted by government representatives.355 For example, 
Professor Robbins's Model Contract calls for an employee of the 
contracting agency to have access to prison facilities and all 
records kept by the contractor at all times.356 The Model Con-
tract further requires the contractor to maintain all records 
353. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4, 67-91. 
354. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4, 67-91. 
355. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 3, at 39; Keating, supra note 3, at 144-46. 
356. Robbins, supra note 2, at 752. 
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required by the American Correctional Association's standards 
for facility accreditation and the contracting agency.357 
If the . prison management firm grants the correctional 
agency complete access to prison records, as the Model Con-
tract requires, the lack of public access to these documents 
through the FOIA may not be a significant issue. After all, any 
records actually transferred to an agency will be disclosable 
under the FOIA.358 Private contractors, wary of contract 
renewal time, are likely to submit only subjective, self-serving, 
or inoffensive reports to the contracting agency.359 But as long 
as the government can review all other internal records, 
accountability, arguably, has been sufficiently guaranteed. 
This analysis presents several problems. First, it raises 
questions as to how effective a monitor the government will 
be. The government's right to examine internal prison docu-
ments is meaningful only if administrators in fact review the 
records, and take action to correct any problems revealed upon 
review. Because of budgetary constraints, many agencies are 
understaffed and thus, perusing docume~ts and inspecting 
private facilities is a low priority.36° Constant supervision of 
prison operations and records, including any on-site monitor-
ing, is expensive.361 An agency therefore has little incentive to 
convert cost savings into monitoring expenses. 
Second, the private correctional firm that procures an initial 
contract with· the government may become absorbed with its 
responsibilities.362 Once the government correctional agency 
has contracted for correctional services with the private sector, 
it may no longer have ready access to the facilities or the staff 
necessary to resume prison operations should the private 
357. Id. 
358. See supra notes 275-82 and accompanying text. 
359. For example, in News & Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Schwab, Twitty & Hanser 
Architectural Group, 596 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1992), a newspaper sought access under 
the Florida Public Records Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. 119 (West 1985), to files concerning 
the construction of public schools. The files were in the possession of an architectural 
firm hired by a school district. The newspaper wanted access to the firm's internal 
records because it claimed that the documents provided to the school district by the 
firm were merely self-serving pronouncements. See also Susman, supra note 288, at 
29 (advising that to protect contract information from FOIA disclosure, a contractor 
should provide for the release of "sanitized, composite, or innocuous information 
where feasible•). 
360. ·See Keating, supra note 3, at 146. 
361. E.S. SAVAS, PRlvATIZING THE PuBLIC SECTOR: How TO SHRINK GoVERNMENT 
153 (1982) (estimating monitoring costs to be one to five percent of the total contract 
price). . 
362. Brakel, supra note 21, at 31. 
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operator prove unsatisfactory. 363 Having invested in the start-
up costs of operating a prison, the initial operator will be able 
to out-bid competing management firms. Eventually, this price 
advantage could permanently drive away the competition.364 
Without alternate prison operators from which to choose, the 
contracting agency will be hard pressed to remove the initial 
contractor. Furthermore, by terminating a prison management 
contract and replacing a private operator for misfeasance, the 
agency itself could receive negative publicity. Rather than 
being "tarred with the same brush," the contracting agency 
might prefer not to monitor prison operations too closely.365 
Third, government monitors are at risk of "capture" by the 
private management firms which they are employed to over-
see.366 Whether as a result of a contractor's "overt corruption 
or subtle cooptation, "367 a government regulator may turn a 
blind eye to contract violations or other abuses. Prison moni-
tors are particularly prone to this risk because many private 
prison managers hire government employees to staff their 
operations. In 1994, for example, each of the CCA's nineteen 
American prison facilities was run by a former government 
corrections employee.368 When an official contract monitor 
knows that he may have a future employment opportunity 
with the private firm being monitored, forging a good rela-
tionship with the potential employer takes precedence over 
insisting on contract compliance. 
Even if government monitors proved competent, honest, and 
incorruptible, exclusive state monitoring of private prisons 
effectively extinguishes the public's ability to observe and 
affect an important part of the criminal justice system. 369 
Private prison operators insist that they can manage prisons 
more effectively than the government, in part because private 
firms are free from political pressures and bureaucratic red 
tape.370 Yet some governmental requirements such as the 
FOIA safeguard important public interests. In the FOIA, 
363. See Gentry, supra note 77, at 357-58 (describing how a private firm that 
secures an initial contract can thwart the government's access to a competitive 
market). 
364. Id. at 358. 
365. Id. at 359. 
366. Id. at 360. 
367. Keating, supra note 3, at 146. 
368. CCA FACILITY PROFILES, supra note 115, at 1-6. 
369. See infra text accompanying note 404. 
370. Diiulio, supra note 27, at 166. 
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Congress made a legislative determination that the govern-
ment should not be trusted to run its affairs without public 
oversight. 371 By removing from public view records pertaining 
to federal private prisons, federal correctional agencies have 
created the very situation that the FOIA was intended to 
avoid. 
B. Amend the FOIA to Apply to Private Entities 
That Perform Agency Functions 
One way to ensure that the public has access to the internal 
records of federal privatized prisons would be for Congress to 
amend the FOIA's definition of "agency" to include private 
entities that perform significant agency functions. 372 The open 
records acts of several states already apply to private organi-
zations that act on behalf of state agencies.373 This solution, 
however, involves several drawbacks. 
One major difficulty with amending the FOIA in this way 
relates to the scope of the amendment. If the definition of 
agency is expanded to apply to private organizations that 
contract with the government, then the FOIA will be enlarged 
dramatically and will include all private government contrac-
tors. The costs of increased administrative compliance and 
additional FOIA requests generated by such an amendment 
would be immense. In Forsham, the Court noted that applying 
the FOIA to documents which the government has "contractu-
al access" would create a class of records of "staggering" 
proportions. 374 
Additionally, by making a private contractor an agency 
under the FOIA, all of the contractor's records would be 
371. See supra text accompanying notes 127-29. 
372. See infra text accompanying notes 404-07. The Supreme Court could accom-
plish the same result by ruling that for purposes of the FOIA, private prison 
management firms constitute agencies, or that such firms' records are agency records. 
However, in Forsham u. Harris, the Court refused to extend either definition to 
private grantees, indicating that it would be inappropriate for the Court to do so 
when Congress had not. 445 U.S. 169, 179-80 (1980). 
373. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.011(2) (West 1985) (defining "[a]gency" as 
including any "public or private agency, person, partnership, corporation, or business 
entity acting on behalf ofany public agency"); GA. CODE ANN.§ 50-18-70(a) (Michie 
1994) (defining "[p]ublic records• as records "received or maintained by a private 
person or entity on behalf of a public office or agency•). 
374. Forsham, 445 U.S. at 186 n.17. 
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subject to disclosure unless the statute limited disclosure to 
materials created in connection with the performance of a 
government function. If the definition is amended to restrict 
FOIA coverage to private entities that perform "governmental 
functions," then either Congress, the courts, or both will have 
to define that term to create a clear division between those 
contractors whose records will be subject to the FOIA and 
those whose records will not. To make daily decisions about 
FOIA requests, agencies need reliable, unambiguous stan-
dards. 
Formulating a practical definition of government function will 
not be easy. Although it may appear relatively straightforward 
that a private entity hired by an agency to provide prison 
management services is performing a governmental function,375 
the result in other contracting situations will not be so clear. 
For example, consider the situation in Forsham where a private 
entity conducted federally funded research regarding the safety 
and effectiveness of antidiabetes drugs.376 The data generated 
by the study were used by the FDA to regulate the use and 
labelling of the drugs.377 Was the research grantee in Forsham 
performing a governmental function? It could be argued that, 
at least in the modern era, citizens depend on the federal 
government to ensure the quality and safety of drugs. In the 
study at issue in Forsham, however, a fifteen million dollar 
federal grant generated fifty-five million records.378 Federally 
funded research and development produces several billion 
records per year.379 FOIA compliance is already a drain on the 
federal budget,380 and it is unrealistic to believe that Congress 
would amend the FOIA when such an amendment would pose 
an administrative burden.381 
375. See supra text accompanying notes 239-43. 
376. For a discussion of the facts presented in Forsham, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 166-72. 
377. 445 U.S. at 172. 
378. Id. 
379. Walterscheid, supra note 244, at 49. 
380. For example, the Department of Health and Human Services alone responded 
to more than 121,000 FOIA requests in 1987 at a cost of more than $8.1 million. Cate 
et al., supra note 348, at 50. 
Critics maintain that the benefits provided by the FOIA do not justify its price. 
For example, 15 years ago, Justice Antonin Scalia described the FOIA as the "Taj 
Mahal of the Doctrine of Unanticipated Consequences, the Sistine Chapel of Cost-
Benefit Analysis Ignored." Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No 
Clothes, REGULATION, MarJApr. 1982, at 14, 15. 
381. Other predicted consequences of enlarging the FOIA to apply to private 
contractors acting as federal research grantees include the "righteous wrath of the 
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Florida's experience of bringing private entities that perform 
government functions under its public records statute illus-
trates the problems that can arise when formulating such a 
definition. In 1975, the Florida legislature amended its Public 
Records Act to apply to any private entity acting "on behalf of 
any public agency."382 The amendment was enacted to prevent 
the state from contracting with private firms, thereby avoiding 
the statute's disclosure requirements.383 The statute defined 
public records as documents made "in connection with the 
transaction of official business by any agency. "384 
Despite this relatively plain language, Florida courts have 
struggled to determine which private entities are covered by 
the Act. In 1989, for example, a Florida appeals court held 
that a private towing company under city contract was per-
forming a governmental function and, therefore, was subject 
to the disclosure requirements of the Public Records Act.385 In 
other cases, however, Florida courts have looked to federal 
case law to interpret the amendment.386 As a result, in 1992, 
the Florida Supreme Court held that an architectural firm 
hired by a local school board to provide services in connection 
with the construction of public schools was not acting "on 
behalf of" a public agency. 387 In reaching its decision, the court 
relied on earlier Florida cases that had applied criteria used 
by federal courts to identify when a private organization had 
become an "agency" under the FOIA.388 The court reasoned 
that the school board had not created the architectural firm, 
nor did it control the firm's "activit[ies] or judgment."389 Fur-
thermore, the court held that the firm was not performing a 
university community" and the availability of American technology to foreign request-
ers, resulting in a threat to U.S. economic competitiveness. Walterscheid, supra note 
244, at 53, 55-59. 
382. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.011(2) (West 1994). 
383. See Times Publishing Co. v. City of St. Petersburg, 558 So. 2d 487, 494 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1990). 
384. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.011(1) (West 1994). 
385. Fox v. News-Press Publishing Co., 545 So. 2d 941 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). 
386. See, e.g., Parsons & Whittemore, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 429 
So. 2d 343, 346 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); see also Marguerite L. Robinson, Note, 
Detectives Following the Wrong Clues: Identification of Private Entities Subject to 
Florida's Public Records Law, 22 STETSON L. REV. 785, 790-91 (1993) (discussing the 
application of federal FOIA case law to the Florida Public Records Act). 
387. News & Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Schwab, Twitty & Hanser Architectural Group, 
596 So. 2d 1029, 1032 (Fla. 1992). 
388. Id. at 1031. 
389. Id. at 1032. 
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government function because it had not been delegated any 
decision-making authority by the school district.390 
By applying federal criteria inappropriate for interpreting 
the Florida Public Records Act amendment, the state court 
neatly sidestepped the purpose of the amendment. 391 The case 
highlights the application and definitional problems that could 
arise upon any amendment to the FOIA that attempts to 
extend it to private prison management firms. Nothing guar-
antees that the federal courts, like the Florida Supreme Court, 
will not look to old case law to interpret a new amendment. 
Although a FOIA amendment applying the Act to private 
prison managers could subject internal prison records to FOIA 
disclosure, this expansion will not be enough alone to ensure 
accountability. Just as government monitoring by itself does 
not provide adequate oversight of federal privatized prisons,392 
neither does a public right of access to internal records, stand-
ing alone. Adequate monitoring must combine several tech-
niques to safeguard prisoners' liberty interests and to protect 
against contractor abuses. 393 
C. Enact Federal Enabling Legislation Governing the 
Conditions Under Which Federal Agencies Can Delegate the 
Responsibility for Prison Management to Private Entities 
Different methods have been proposed to ensure the ac-
countability of privately operated prisons, including govern-
ment monitoring and inspections,394 public and press visits to 
prison facilities,395 public access to prison records,396 and 
application of heightened standards of judicial review.397 Even 
390. Id. 
, 391. For a critical analysis of Schwab, see generally Robinson, supra note 386. 
392. See supra text accompanying notes 360-65. 
393. See, e.g., Keating, supra note 3, at 152 (calling for a "rich mixture" of moni-
toring approaches in private prisons to ensure accountability). 
394. See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 2, at 752 (proposing a model contract which 
requires an on-site monitor with access to all areas and records of the facility). 
395. See, e.g., id. at 752-53 (Model Contract § 6(B)) (providing for public access 
to private correctional facilities). · 
. 396. See, e.g., Gentry, supra note 77, at 363-65 (recommending public access to 
private prison records combined with a system of fines and bonuses imposed on 
private prison operators). 
397. David N. Wecht, Note, Breaking the Code of Deference: Judicial Review of 
Private Prisons, 96 YALE L.J. 815, 834-37 (1987). 
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economic incentives and disincentives such as bonuses and 
fines398 and a royalty system based on recidivism rates have 
been suggested to align more closely the government's and the 
private operator's interests.399 While this Article has focused 
on the FOIA status of internal private prison records, it does 
not suggest that public access to contractor documents alone 
will ensure accountability. As noted earlier, effective monitor-
ing involves many different means of observation and over-
sight. 
In the federal context, however, nothing provides a set of 
uniform standards to guarantee that private prison operators 
are subjected to a minimum level of accountability. There is no 
uniformity because, unlike state legislatures that have turned 
prison operations over to private managers, Congress has not 
enacted legislation authorizing federal correctional agencies to 
privatize their facilities. 400 This lack of legislative guidance 
means that federal agencies are free to use their discretion in 
setting, amending, or ignoring accountability standards in 
their contracts. Although a federal correctional agency may 
provide for a sophisticated monitoring system in its contracts 
today, nothing ensures that provisions for accountability will 
appear in future contracts. 
This Article proposes that Congress pass legislation requiring 
that all prison records created and maintained by a private 
prison operator be subject to disclosure under the FOIA. By 
using the FOIA's existing framework, privacy interests of 
federal prisoners and prison personnel, as well as legitimate 
confidential commercial information belonging to prison manag-
ers, would still be protected by FOIA exemptions. In this way, 
prisoners and other FOIA requesters would be entitled to the 
same procedural remedies and safeguards that currently exist 
under the FOIA. 
Additionally, such legislation should limit mandated disclo-
sure to materials that pertain to the operation of private 
prison facilities. Such a limit would ensure that the legislation 
comports with the FOIA's purpose of providing access only to 
those records concerning important matters of public policy. 
Without this limitation, FOIA requesters could use the legisla-
398. Gentry, supra note 77, at 360-63. 
399. Kenneth L. Avio, On Private Prisons: An Economic Analysis of the Model 
Contract and Model Statute for Private Incarceration, 17 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & 
CIV. CONFINEMENT 265, 294-95 (1991). 
400. See supra text accompanying notes 99-105. 
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tion to uncover information about prison management firms 
that bears no relation to the performance of a governmental 
function. 
Congress could leave the terms of FOIA cost and compliance 
to negotiation between the government and the contractor. 
However, because the agency already will have established 
FOIA guidelines and be familiar with the Act's administrative 
requirements, it would make more sense to require the agency 
to carry out the task. By giving the agency the administrative 
burdens of indexing, searching for, and producing records, the 
private contractor will be less able to conceal or overlook 
requested documents. 
A workable solution would be for the statute to provide that 
all records regarding the operations of a federal privatized 
prison be deemed as belonging to the contracting agency, and 
to give the agency the responsibility of making these records 
available to the public in accordance with the FOIA. Compli-
ance with the FOIA is a "hidden cost"401 that agencies already 
bear in operating public prisons. The cost of providing access 
to a private operator's records should not be substantially 
higher than what agencies already expend with respect to 
these public facilities. 
By enacting legislation governing private prison operations, 
Congress will have an opportunity to address other important 
issues, besides access to records, that are raised by prison 
privatization. Privatization frequently has been criticized as 
undemocratic because it provides little room for citizen input 
to the creation of public policy.402 Congress can add a measure 
of political accountability to the privatiZation equation by 
codifying policies regarding prisoner classification decisions, 
disciplinary sanctions, the use of force by private operators, 
determinations of good time for prisoners, and questions of 
contractor liability.403 
The need for legislation providing a right of access to private 
prison records and facilities is especially acute because of Su-
preme Court decisions denying the existence of a First Amend-
401. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
402. Al Bilik, Privatization: Defacing the Community, 43 LAB. L.J., 338, 342 
(1992); Field, supra note 63, at 670. 
403. For a general discussion of these issues, see Robbins, supra note 2 (reviewing 
a broad range of policy issues regarding private incarceration), and Woolley, supra 
note 4 (focusing on Pennsylvania legislation and providing a guide to corrections 
officers, government administrators, and legislators). 
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ment right of access to government-operated prisons.404 In one 
of these cases, Houchins v. KQED, Inc., the Court, in a four to 
three decision, rejected a television station's claim of a First 
Amendment right of access to a county jail.405 Writing for the 
plurality, Chief Justice Burger stated that the issue of access 
was a legislative matter to be resolved by the political pro-
cess.406 Although different interests would be presented in a 
case involving a private prison, the Court would likely consider 
access to privatized prisons also a matter for the legislature. 
If so, unless Congress authorizes a public right of access to 
private prisons, citizens will lack any legally enforceable right 
to information regarding this important aspect of the criminal 
justice system. Like administrators prior to enactment of the 
FOIA, private prison operators will be free to ex:ercise their 
"official grace" regarding whether, when, and how to commu-
nicate with citizens and the media.407 Although a detailed 
analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, if Congress refuses 
to implement a legislative solution establishing public account-
ability of privatized corrections, the Supreme Court should 
revisit the prison cases and mandate a constitutional right of 
access to private prisons for the public and the press under the 
First Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
Prison privatization may prove to be all that its supporters 
claim: a way for the government to construct prisons more 
quickly, to manage prisons more economically, and to operate 
prisons with more flexibility, resulting in cheaper, more effec-
tive inmate care. No matter what arguments exist against 
private prisons, their existence of private prisons is a fact oflife 
404. These "prison cases• include Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) 
(holding that a county sheriffs restrictive policy on access to county jail did not 
violate the First Amendment); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) 
(upholding a federal prison ban on media interviews with specific prisoners); and Pell 
v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (upholding a state prison ban on media interviews 
with specific prisoners). For a critical analysis of the prison cases, see Leonard G. 
Leverson, Constitutional Limits on the Power to Restrict Access to Prisons: An 
Historical Re-examination, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409 (1983). 
405. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 1. 
406. Id. at 14-16. 
407. See CROSS, supra note 123, at vii-xi. 
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in federal corrections. Government reliance on the private 
sector to provide correctional services is a trend that undoubt-
edly will continue. 
Regardless of whether they are public or private, all prisons 
are secretive places. Along with secrecy comes the potential for 
abuse. Past experience reveals the importance of public over-
sight of prisons to protect the safety, well-being, and liberty 
interests of prisoners, as well as to ensure the proper expendi-
ture of public funds. The accountability principle demands that 
private prisons must be at least as accountable to the public as 
government facilities are. 
In at least one significant way, however, privatized federal 
facilities are even more impenetrable than government-operated 
prisons. Although records promulgated by federal correctional 
agencies are subject to public disclosure under the FOIA, 
documents maintained by private prison operators are largely 
inaccessible under the Act. By contracting with private prison 
operators, federal correctional agencies shield what otherwise 
would have been public information from public scrutiny. This 
frustrates the FOIA's purpose of guaranteeing the public the 
right to monitor government· activities. 
The Supreme Court has stated that "it is important that 
society's criminal process 'satisfy the appearance of justice'. .. 
and the appearance of justice can best be provided by allowing 
people to observe it. "4os Congress can best ensure that federal 
privatized correctional facilities "satisfy the appearance of 
justice" by enacting legislation that subjects private operators 
to uniform standards of accountability. These standards must 
include a right of public access to records created and main-
tained by private prison operators as part of a comprehensive 
system of monitoring and oversight. Whatever public benefits 
may accrue from prison privatization are not worth the risks 
posed to prisoners and the criminal justice system by "the 
return of government secrecy through the agency back door."409 
408. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571-72 (1980) (plurali-
ty opinion) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)). 
409. O'Connell, supra note 340, at 627. 

